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Abstract
This research develops three essays on environmental issues in Brazil. The
first two essays look at the effects of rural credit and land-use change in Brazil.
Previous economic models have come to the conclusion that rural credit loans
extended to farmers increases deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon region by
encouraging land expansion.
The first essay is an analysis of deforestation in the Legal Amazon region.
The paper uses municipality-level panel data to examine the effects of rural
credit on deforestation while controlling for land constraints. The hypothesis
is that farmers that are land constrained do not use rural credit to deforest.
The land constraints that are considered include high population pressures,
abundance of low quality soil, high areas of savannah, and low quality trans-
portation networks. These constraints are included in a regression analyses to
explain deforestation through the use of dummy variables and the interaction
of the dummy variables with rural credit. Key findings suggest that credit in
municipalities with high rural populations is associated with a decrease in de-
forestation. Credit in municipalities with low quality soil is associated with an
increase in deforestation, suggesting the credit incentivizes the clearing of oth-
erwise marginal land. No conclusions can be made about the effects of cerrado
and poor transportation networks.
The second paper is a countrywide analysis of biofuel crop acreage response
to credit availability and availability risk using municipality-level panel data. In
the first step, the model employs a participation model using a logit regression
ii
to describe the factors that determine whether or not a given municipality
planted a particular crop. In the second step, an OLS-regression is used to
describe crop acreage as a function of acreage in the previous time period,
expected prices, and rural credit. The analysis compares the acreage response
of sugarcane to that of beans, coffee, soybeans, rice, and wheat. The comparison
is made within crops and across six regions, as well as, within regions and across
crops. Findings suggest, sugarcane acreage is more responsive in the South
to increases in rural credit in comparison to the Southeast, Amazon Interior,
and Coastal Northeast. Similarly, response to rural credit availability risk is
statistically different in the Amazon Interior from that of other regions. Also
coffee is more responsive than sugarcane to credit in the Southern region
The third paper looks at the effects of an environmental tax on the Brazil-
ian economy. Using a Computable General Equilibrium model, the supply and
prices of goods, labor, and services is determined. Consumer utility is also
measured. The model simulates various tax schemes ranging form 1% to 20%
implemented on the construction, industrial, and transportation sectors. Fol-
lowing the tax there is an increase in wages for construction workers, which is
most likely due to an increase in the demand for fixed investments. Consump-
tion of corn, sugarcane, beans, manioc and processed foods decrease. On the
other hand coffee, rice and livestock consumption increase. Net utility within
the economy increases.
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Chapter 1: The Effects of Rural Credit and Land
Constraints on Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
1. Introduction
Deforestation is a major problem in many areas of the world. According to the
Food and Agricultural Organization (2010), between 1990 and 2010 over 150 million
hectares of land were deforested around the globe. During this time period, Brazil
had the highest loss of forest worldwide. Because many negative externalities are
associated with deforestation, these extreme levels of forest loss are of great concern.
On a global scale, forests aid in the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Deforestation releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere which contributes to global
climate change (Nepstad, 2007). At the local level, forests provide protection from
flooding and drought while regulating temperature and rainfall. Social problems
such as land seizure and disregard of native inhabitants also stem from deforestation
(Conklin and Graham, 1995).
Official Rural Credit loans are cited as a major contributor to deforestation of the
Brazilian Amazon (Binswanger, 1991; Pfaff, 1999; Prates, 2008). These loans promote
agricultural land expansion because they are usually extended at negative real interest
rates. This paper will contribute to the extant literature by investigating how credit
contributes to deforestation when farmers are resource constrained, the hypothesis
being that these constraints encourage farmers to make investments in technologies
that lead to increased agricultural productivity and decreased deforestation rates.
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2. Background
2.1. Occupation and Deforestation in the Legal Amazon Region
The 1910s were characterized by stagnant economic growth in several northern Brazil-
ian municipalities. Many of these municipalities relied heavily on the exportation of
latex and were negatively impacted by the collapse in the world price of rubber (Re-
sor, 1977). In 1948, due to development concerns, the Brazilian government created
the political boundaries of the Legal Amazon, which was composed of these underde-
veloped municipalities situated in the states of Acre, Amazonas, Amapa´, Maranha˜o,
Mato Grosso, Para´, Rondoˆnia, and Tocantins (Andersen, 2002). Between the 1960s
and 1980s, the government implemented a series of policy initiatives to promote oc-
cupation and economic development of the Legal Amazon. These policies included
building roads, subsidizing credit, and waiving income tax requirements for approved
development projects (Schneider, 1995). These actions stimulated migration into the
region, tripled the regional income per capita, and increased the demand for cleared
land (See Table 1 on the following page).
In addition to over 3 million acres of rainforest, known as the Brazilian Amazon,
the Legal Amazon is composed of areas of savanna, known as cerrado, and wetland,
known as patannal (See Figure 1 on page 4). In 1988, evidence of climate change
and carbon leakage led Brazil to establish a deforestation monitoring program under
Brazil’s Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, or
INPE)1. However, the pace of forest clearing in the Brazilian Amazon continued
to increase from 1990 to 2000. Approximately 91% of land deforested in the Legal
Amazon since 1970 is currently used for livestock pasture. The increase in the demand
for livestock is primarily a result of an increase in the international demand for beef.
1INPE Monitoring Program Website: http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php
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Table 1: Historical Key Variables: Legal Amazonian States
Year Population size Cattle herd Farm area Per capita
(thousand) (million) (% of area) income
1910 2,078 - - 416
1920 2,542 4.54 6.00% 95
1940 3,056 3.94 7.10% 147
1950 3,845 7.04 6.50% 155
1960 5,705 12.96 6.50% 193
1970 7,716 14.75 6.50% 273
1980 11,755 14.86 11.60% 936
1990 16,988 26.26 11.50% -
2000 21,057 47.54 17.10% -
2010 25,474 77.32 27.40% -
Source: IPEA data, Andersen et. al (2004)
Recent satellite data also suggests that a significant portion of cleared land is now
used for crops. In 2003, for example, more than 20 percent of deforested land in the
state of Mato Grosso was converted to cropland (Bettwy, 2006).
2.2. Brief History of the Agricultural Sector
Agriculture plays an important economic role in Brazil and other developing countries.
Not only does agriculture provide food for expanding populations, it is a main source
of income for many of the world’s rural poor (See Figure 2 on the following page). For
Brazil, agriculture accounts for 5% of the GDP, and employs about one quarter of the
labor force. The agricultural sector is also one of the only sectors in which exports
exceed imports and consistently maintains this balance of trade. Agriculture and
livestock products accounted for 32% of Brazil’s total exports in 2011, while their
share in total imports was only 5% (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food
Supply, 2012).
During the time period of immigration into the Legal Amazon region, the Brazilian
3
Figure 1: Biomes of the Legal Amazon Region
Source: IBGE Spatial Data
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Figure 2: Worldwide Agriculture as a Percentage of GDP in 2005
Source: World Bank Databank, 2014a,b
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government followed an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) approach to reduce
dependency on foreign imports. The agricultural sector expanded in the Center-West
and Cerrado regions of Brazil due to ISI policies that promoted subsidized credit, min-
imum prices, and government stock (Teitel and Thoumi, 1986). Following the Latin
American debt crisis, economic reforms of the 1990s emphasized trade liberalization
and privatization, taking away much of the government support toward agriculture.
Still, the agricultural sector continued to grow, shifting from traditional agricultural
practices to a sector characterized by large-scale farming, increased agricultural re-
search, and technological changes (USDA: ERS, 2012b).
Brazil has become a prominent producer in several commodities including sug-
arcane, coffee, cocoa, and soybeans. Livestock production has become increasingly
important due to changes in consumer preferences and an increase in international
agricultural demands (Pereira et al., 2012). The World Bank warns that depletion
and degradation of land will pose serious challenges to meeting future food and agri-
cultural demands (World Bank, 2014). This is particularly concerning for the Legal
Amazon Region because of its abundance of low quality soil (Verweij et al., 2009).
Currently domestic support to Brazilian agricultural producers includes subsidized
credit and price support programs (Fearnside, 2005; USDA: ERS, 2012b).
2.3. The Role of Rural Credit
Throughout this paper rural credit refers to official credit used for investing in, mar-
keting, and producing agricultural and livestock commodities. Rural credit has the
potential to increase the welfare of the farmer by allowing farmers to obtain a source
of income during periods in which little cash revenue is earned and expenditures for
inputs and consumption still must be met. Due to the production cycle of agricul-
ture, farm income is generally received shortly after harvest. In the absence of credit
5
markets, farmers must maintain cash reserves to cover expenditures throughout the
rest of the production cycle. Credit also allows farmers to spread their costs in order
to make purchases that have large initial investments (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993;
Diagne and Zeller, 2001).
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, 30% of Brazil’s agriculture and livestock
resources are funded by rural credit (Ministe´rio da Agricultura, Pecua´ria e Abasteci-
mento, 2003). Rural credit is disbursed through the National System of Rural Credit
(Sistema Nacional de Cre´dito Rural, or SNCR) and administered by the Central Bank,
private banks, and credit cooperatives according to rules and conditions established
in the Central Bank’s Manual of Rural Credit (Manual de Cre´dito Rural). In addition
to the SNCR, farmers can access additional credit from other private sources such as
traders, processors, and input manufacturers. The primary goals of the SNCR include
providing credit for investments in programs to boost competitiveness; measures to
support agricultural production and marketing; and programs to generate employ-
ment, income, and modernization of agriculture (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2013; Ministe´rio da
Agricultura, Pecua´ria e Abastecimento, 2003). Table 2 on the next page shows the
allocation of rural credit disbursed through the SNCR.
3. Conceptual Framework
The following explanation of the profit maximization problem faced by the farmer is
adapted from Assunc¸a˜o et al. (2013). It is assumed that an individual farmer has T
units of cleared land and seeks to maximize profits from the production of commodity
Y. Commodity production is defined by the Cobb-Douglass process Y = ATβ. In
this simplified example, it is assumed that land is homogeneous, and the agricultural
production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale (β < 0) and A is the positive
constant level of technology. A farmer can expand his current holding of land by
6
Table 2: National Allocation of Rural Credit in Brazil - 2010
Item Program (interest rate and length of loan where appropriate)
1 Resources for production and marketing 39,765
Banks set aside (6.75 percent per year) 26,585
Rural savings (6.75 percent per year) 7,916
PRONAMP (6.25 percent per year) 3,712
Other funds (6.25 percent per year) 1,553
Bank of Brazil
Cooperative banks
2 Resources for investment programs 13,203
BNDES programs2 6,273
MODERFROTA (9.50 percent per year, up to 8 years) 896
MODERAGRO (6.75 percent per year, up to 10 years) 508
MODERINFRA (6.75 percent per year, up to 12 years) 597
PROGRAMA ABC (5.55 percent per year)3 1,882
PRODECOOP (6.75 percent per year; up to 12 years)4 1,195
Other BNDES programs 1,195
Other credit lines or programs 6,930
Constitutional funds (6.75 percent year) 3,047
Other BNDES programs 3,883
3 Lending at market rates 10,843
Rural savings 2,599
Resources at market rates 1,195
Bank of Brazil, Rural Promissory Note (CPR) 7,049
4 Total rural commercial credit (1 + 2 + 3) 63,811
5 Family agriculture 9,559
6 TOTAL (4+5) 73,369
2 Brazilian Development Bank.
3 Program for Low Carbon Agriculture.
4 Program for Cooperatives.
Source:USDA: ERS (2012a)
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clearing T units of forested land while taking into consideration the costs of clearing
additional land. Equation ?? represents the maximization problem faced by the
farmer. In the Equation, the costs of using previously cleared land are normalized to
1 and the shadow costs associated with clearing land are expressed by λ > 0. The
output price of commodity Y is represented by the variable p. It is assumed that the
shadow costs incorporate the costs associated with additional labor, machinery, etc.
Max
T
pi =

pATβ − T if T∗ < T
pATβ − T + λ(T − T) if T∗ > T
(1)
After solving the maximization problem, the optimal value of land is expressed in
Equation 2. Equation 2 shows that farmers will clear additional land if a farmer can
receive an agricultural output price that is sufficiently high to cover additional costs
of clearing. If agricultural output prices are lower than this threshold, the farmer will
decide to harvest at or below T :
T∗ =

1
βpA
1
β−1 < T if p < T
1−β
βA
T if T
1−β
βA ≤ p ≤ T
1−β
βA (1+ λ)
1+λ
βpA
1
β−1 > T if p > T
1−β
βA (1+ λ)
(2)
The response of land usage given a change in the shadow costs of clearing land can be
found by taking the derivative of the optimal value of T with respect to the shadow
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price as seen in Equation 3 where γ = 2−β1−β :
∂T∗
∂λ
=

0 if p ≤ T1−ββA (1+ λ)
− 11−β (βpA)
1
1−β
(1+λ)γ < 0 if p >
T1−β
βA (1+ λ)
(3)
The negative partial for the derivative associated with a sufficiently high value
of p shows that if clearing costs increase, the optimal amount of cleared land will
decrease. In the case of official rural credit, it is subsidized by the government at
below market rates which often result in negative real interest rates. This leads to a
decrease in clearing costs and an increase in cleared land, which has been captured
in previous literature. However, if the costs of clearing land are exorbitantly high,
subsidized credit would only allow farmers to consume up to T.
The use of a one-input Cobb-Douglas production function leads to a closed form
solution when obtaining the partial derivative shown in Equation 3. This makes the
direction of the partial easy to determine. Adding a layer of complexity, consider an
agricultural production process that utlizes two inputs capital, K, and land:
Y = AKαTβ (4)
To understand how capital influences land used in the agricultural production
process, the indirect demand function for land can be obtained as seen in Equation
5 where γ = 1α+β and the price of land is r and the price of capital is w:
T∗ = [ 1
A
(
βw
αr
)αY]γ (5)
Which is a Cobb-Douglas production function with the price of capital and land
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being the determinants of land output. Ideally in order to measure the equation
empirically, data on capital and land price would be obtained and regressed on the
demand for deforested land. Since capital data is unavailable, rural credit will be
used as a proxy as the amount of rural credit is reflective of the cost of capital
acquisition (i.e. higher amounts of credit would be associated with lower costs of
capital). Similarly, since there is no formal market for land, the price of land can
be proxied by characteristics of land that determines the value of land such as soil
quality, temperature and rainfall.
The highlight of this paper is to examine how certain resource constraints affect
the optimal quantity of land to deforest due to increasing or decreasing clearing costs.
Now consider the credit variable, C, which can have a positive impact on deforestation,
Dt, if it is used to clear land, or a negative or no impact on deforestation if it is
used to invest in technology that leads to productivity gains. The Cobb-Douglass
function in Equation 5 can be linearized by taking the log of both sides and estimated
empircally. Equation 6 illustrates such a transformation. Variable X is a vector of
other explanatory variables and LC represents a land constraint. Without inclusion
of a term that captures clearing costs, the coefficient observed will be the sum of the
positive and negative components as seen in Equation 6.
log(Dt) = logA+ α1logC− α2logC+ α3LC+ e
= logA+ (α1 − α2)logC+ α3LC+ e
(6)
Incorporating additional information regarding clearing costs, will help to disentangle
the positive and negative impacts credit may have on deforestation. Given the results
from the derivatives in Equation 3 the following hypothesis is developed:
Farmers that are land constrained face higher clearing costs. With access to sub-
sidized credit, with loan rates at below market values, clearing costs are lowered.
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If clearing costs remain sufficiently high, a farmer has no incentive to clear addi-
tional land. Instead, the farmer will use credit to invest in technology that leads
to productivity gains, resulting in lower rates of deforestation.
The hypothesis will be tested by including an interaction of the land constraint
with the credit variable, as seen in Equation 7, and observing the sum of the coeffi-
cients α1 and α2:
log(Dt) = logA+ α1logC+ α2logC ∗ LC+ α3LC+ e (7)
If the sum of α1 and α2 are significantly negative then, according to the model, that
rural credit used in land constrained municipalities is correlated with decreases in
deforestation. Formally, the null and alternative hypothesis can be written as follows:
H0 : α1 + α2 ≥ 0
H1 : α1 + α2 < 0
(8)
The Empirical Model
Based on our conceptual model given in Equation 7 along with the developed hy-
pothesis, the following empirical model is considered:
log(Dt) = logA+ βConstraintt + α1logCreditt + α2logCreditt ∗ Constraintt
+ δXt−1 + θZt + e
(9)
Where Xt−1 represents the vector of endogenous variables instrumented by their
lagged values and Zt represents the vector of exogenous variables. It is assumed that
cow density, area of cropland, population densities, and transportation expenditures
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are endogenous. It is assumed that state fixed effects, year fixed effects, temperature,
rainfall, unobservable satellite data, soil characteristics, distance to the state capital,
and distance to the federal capital are exogenous. The model is estimated using OLS.
4. Literature Review
Before addressing how credit impacts deforestation, it is important to understand
the socio-economic characteristics that have been linked to deforestation in previous
studies. The underlying hypothesis behind deforestation models is that deforesta-
tion is driven by economic incentives. Since many forest benefits have no market,
and hence no explicit economic value, forests’ role as a carbon sink and a source of
biodiversity are often not taken into account. Thus, deforestation occurs because it
is more profitable than conservation in the short run. This notion is especially true
in developing countries, such as Brazil, where local communities rely on forests for
their well-being and for subsistence agriculture. Many deforestation models find that
farmers clear forest to expand agricultural and pastoral land within the same or the
next time period (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012; Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). The farmer
is a profit maximizing agent and therefor makes the decision to deforest based on
parameters of choice, such as the prices of commodities to be produced, production
costs, and other incentives. Hausman (2012) finds that soybean prices appear to con-
tribute to acreage conversion and land use change in ecologically important areas of
Brazil. Similarly, Hargrave and Kis-Katos (2013) find higher meat prices are corre-
lated with higher rates of deforestation. Transportation costs are often incorporated
into models by considering access to roads, distance to major cities, and topographical
features of the land. Soil type, precipitation, rainfall, and other geo-spatial character-
istics that directly affect the profitability of agriculture have been shown to influence
deforestation (Cropper et al., 1997; Chomitz and Gray, 1996).
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Characteristics of the population are generally included to account for the demand
for agricultural land. Since rural and urban populations have different effects on defor-
estation, these two groups are often modeled separately. Individuals located in urban
areas usually have no direct impact on deforestation, since they tend to work in the
service industry and are located far from forests. Urban populations do, however, indi-
rectly affect deforestation through their demand for agricultural goods. Some authors
measure these population characteristics by considering variables such as population
growth rates, while others use measures of population densities (Kaimowitz and An-
gelsen, 1998). Spillover effects from neighboring areas are often incorporated into
deforestation models. These variables are often weighted by some distance measure.
Empirical evidence suggests that neighboring population pressures, law enforcement,
and road access have spillover effects on deforestation in a nearby area (Pfaff et al.,
2007). Often times factors that increase the attractiveness of rural areas are also con-
sidered since they tend to be positively correlated with deforestation, presumably due
to an increased likelihood of immigration into the region. For example, Andersen and
Reis (1997) find that favorable conditions for factors such as accessibility, availability,
market conditions, and fiscal incentives are all correlated with higher deforestation
rates.
Endogeneity issues have been argued and addressed in several papers. While there
is no clear consensus on which variables are endogenous and which are not, popula-
tion, roads, and GDP appear most in these arguments. Some authors have tried to
correct these possible endogeneity issues through use of instrumental variables, GMM
regressions, lagging explanatory variables, or dropping the variables that are poten-
tially endogenous (Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013; Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998;
Andersen, 2002). The approach used in this paper will be to lag the explanatory
variables, as is most common in the literature.
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The effects of policies implemented specifically by the Brazilian government have
been analyzed in a number of papers. Pfaff et al. (2011) observe federally protected
areas are associated with lower levels of deforestation, while state protected areas
do not see a similar decrease in deforestation. Assunc¸a˜o et al. (2012) find that the
Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon is
responsible for over 50% of the reduction in deforestation between the 2005 and 2009
time frame. The Action Plan aims to coordinate efforts among the federal, state, and
municipal governments by increasing monitoring and enforcement of deforestation.
The role of property rights on deforestation is unclear. Wood and Walker (2001) find
owners with land titles generally deforest less, while Perz and Walker (2002) observe
that land titles are necessary to receive rural credit, which has been linked to increases
in deforestation.
Authors use different specifications of the deforestation variable in their modeling
approach. In some analyses, deforestation is measured as the area of forest land lost
between two different time periods, usually this interval is one year. Other models
specify the dependent variable as the amount of crop acreage, a proxy for defor-
estation (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). There is also a series of literature that
use probit or multivariate logit regressions wherein the dependent variable is trans-
formed into a discrete category of land-use (Chomitz and Gray, 1996; Mahapatr and
Kant, 2005). Specification of the dependent variable is important to consider, since
each specification models slightly different phenomena. Probit and logit models are
ideal for predicting and influencing where deforestation will take place. Use of crop
acreage as the dependent variable, tends to capture factors that increase the demand
for crops but may not capture factors that increase the demand for livestock com-
modities. Some models normalize the dependent variable to account for heterogeneity
of size and heterogeneity of wealth (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012; Kaimowitz and Angelsen,
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1998). Heterogeneity of size is important to consider as larger municipalities tend to
have higher amounts of deforestation because they have higher areas and quantities
of forest cover. Not including such a normalization may cause regression output to
describe characteristics of municipalities that are larger in area leading to biased re-
sults. The causes of deforestation can be studied at various scales ranging from the
household, local, regional, national, and global level (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998).
4.1. Rural Credit in Deforestation Literature
Several deforestation papers focus on the impact credit has on deforestation. Bin-
swanger (1991) is one of the first economists to mention the possibility that rural
credit can increase deforestation by encouraging land expansion. Binswanger argues
that rural credit at below market interest rates acts as a subsidy, increasing invest-
ment in agricultural activities more than optimal. Andersen (1996) tests Binswanger’s
hypothesis by looking at the number of loans provided in a given municipality. Sim-
ilarly, Pfaff (1999) tests the correlation between deforestation and bank densities.
Both Andersen and Pfaff find that their proxies for credit are positively correlated
with deforestation, however both authors acknowledge that the proxies may not prop-
erly capture credit availability, suggesting that the amount of credit would be ideal.
A study by Branda˜o and Souza (2006) finds that migrants into certain settle-
ments within the Legal Amazon are highly motivated by credit eligibility, and these
migrants deforest at rates four times higher than the rest of the population. Wood
and Walker (2001) test the hypothesis that title ownership has a positive environmen-
tal effect. They find that land owners are more likely to use credit to apply fertilizers.
Additionally they observe that title owners tend to refrain from timber exploitation.
More recently, data availability has allowed several economists to measure the
effects of rural credit using the quantity of rural credit loaned to farmers throughout
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the Legal Amazon. In a study, Hargrave and Kis-Katos (2013) find that increases in
agricultural credit density are associated with increases in deforestation rates. Prates
(2008) and Prates and Bacha (2012) also find a positive correlation between defor-
estation and official rural credit. Assunc¸a˜o et al. (2013) uses differences-in-differences
estimation to see how a credit policy that implemented stricter legal and environmen-
tal requirements influences deforestation. They find that the policy change reduced
the amount of rural credit and curbed deforestation primarily in municipalities where
cattle ranching is a prominent economic activity.
4.2. Rural Credit and Agricultural Productivity
Rural credit can be used to invest in technology and inputs that increase agricultural
productivity. A number of papers support this hypothesis. Binswanger and Khandker
(1995), for example, conclude that subsidized formal credit in India increases income
and agricultural productivity and the benefits exceed the cost by over 13 percent.
Similarly, Feder et al. (1990) link farm credit in China to investment and consumption
activities and observe that one yuan of credit yields 0.235 yuan of additional gross
value of output. In the case of Brazil, Rada and Valdes (2012) find that a 1% increase
in rural credit would lead to a 0.07% increase in technical efficiency.
The use of rural credit to increase agricultural productivity is a realistic prospect
for the Legal Amazon. The region is known for it’s relatively poor soils and the
sustainability of agriculture within the region is widely debated. Some advocate that
increasing the productivity of the land through greater use of fertilizers can slow down
deforestation (Faminow et al., 1998; Souza Serrao et al., 1978), although the economic
feasibility is debatable (Wood and Walker, 2001).
This paper differs from previous deforestation literature by attempting to under-
stand characteristics of municipalities in which rural credit is used to invest in inputs
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and technology that lead to productivity gains rather than land expansion. The hy-
pothesis is that municipalities that are resource constrained will use credit to increase
agricultural productivity. Observing the factors that influence municipalities to use
credit for deforestation is important when implementing policy change.
5. Data
This paper uses municipality-level panel data on deforestation and its determinants
from the Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, or
INPE); the Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia
e Estat´ıstica, or IBGE); the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de
Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada, or IPEA); and the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco
Central do Brasil, or BCB) . For the years 2000 to 2010, of the 771 municipalities in the
Brazilian Legal Amazon Region, data availability limits the number of municipality
observations to 741. Due to some data outliers, such as obvious errors in data entry,
a handful of observations are dropped resulting in an unbalanced panel. Similarly,
observations from the year 2000 and 2001 are lost due to use of lagged explanatory
variables.
5.1. Overview of the data
The early 2000s were characterized by Brazil’s highest rates of deforestation. Between
2000 and 2004, over 110,000 square kilometers of forest cover were lost in the Legal
Amazon region (See Figure 3). Similarly, during this time frame, the stock of rural
credit increased by an average of 23% a year. Starting in 2005, the rate of deforestation
decreased dramatically. The stock of rural credit also decreased by 8% and was
followed by a 23% decline in 2006. By 2008 the rural credit stock appears to diverge
from its seemingly positive correlation with deforestation that is captured in previous
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regression models. From 2008-2012 the stock of rural credit continued to increase,
while deforestation rates were on the decline.
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Figure 3: Deforestation and Rural Credit Stock in the Legal Amazon Region
Source: INPE (2014); IBGE (2014)
5.1.1. Deforestation
Annual data on deforestation is calculated and publicly released by INPE. Information
on the methodology used to calculate annual rates of deforestation can be found
on the Brazilian Amazon Monitoring Program website5. Satellite imagery that is
not observable (due to cloud cover, for instance) is also obtained from INPE and
5INPE’s Brazilian Amazon monitoring program Website: http://www.obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php
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included in the regression analyses. The primary regression analyses are used to
estimate the empirical model outlaid in Equation 9. In these initial regressions, in
order to account for heterogeneity of municipality size, the dependent variable is
normalized to a percentage as seen in Equation 10. Accounting for heterogeneity of
size is particularly relevant because larger municipalities tend to have larger areas of
forest cover, and thus larger amounts of deforestation. Simply regressing determinants
of deforestation without such a normalization may instead explain the characteristics
of a large municipality, and provides more robust measuremements according to the
literature.
De f orestationt =
AreaDe f orestedt
ForestCovert + AreaDe f orestedt
=
AreaDe f orestedt
ForestCovert−1
(10)
Figure 4 shows the distribution of deforestation after accounting for heterogeneity
of municipality size. After normalizing for heterogeneity of size, different specifica-
tions of the dependent variable are considered in subsequent regressions to test for
robustness.
5.1.2. Rural Credit
This paper only considers the affect of official rural credit disbursed through the
SNCR due to lack of data availability regarding private lending practices. Official
rural credit can be directed toward financing crop and livestock production, as well
as capital investments in agricultural infrastructure and equipment. Data on credit
comes from BCB6 Annual Rural Credit Yearbook (Anua´rio Estat´ıstico do Cre´dito
Rural). All observations are normalized into reais in the year 2000 and are divided
by municipality area minus the area of land not suitable for agriculture as seen in
6BCB Website: http://www.bcb.gov.br/
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Figure 4: Percentage of Forest Loss, 2000-2010
Source: IBGE(2014); INPE(2014)
Equation 11, where land not suitable for agriculture includes large bodies of water,
rocky soil, and steep slopes as defined by INPE.
Creditt =
Creditt
MunicipalityArea− Not f orAgArea (11)
5.1.3. Population Densities
During the time frame of this study, head counts for rural and urban populations are
only available for the years 2000, 2007, and 2010. To avoid endogeneity issues and to
avoid assuming the population values for 8 years of missing observations, population
densities are calculated from observations obtained in the year 2000 using the formulas
displayed in equations 12 and 13. Rural population density is divided by the area of
municipality land that can be occupied by human inhabitants, which is assumed to
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be the municipality area minus the area of water.
RuralDensity =
RuralPopulation2000
MunicipalityArea−WaterArea (12)
UrbanDensity =
UrbanPopulation2000
MunicipalityArea−WaterArea (13)
Average neighboring rural and urban populations densities are calculated by taking
the average of the rural and urban population densities in adjacent municipalities.
5.1.4. Agricultural Characteristics and Transportation Costs
Data on the area of cropland and number of cows in a given municipality are obtained
from the Automatic Recovery System of IBGE website7 . Transportation costs are
incorporated into the model by considering the amount of government expenditures
on the transportation network, as a proxy for road conditions; distance to the state
capital; and distance to the federal capital. These variables have been obtained from
the IPEA website8 .
5.1.5. Fixed Effects
State and year fixed effects are incorporated into the regression models using dummy
variables. Other fixed effects are incorporated by considering the percentage of mu-
nicipality land covered in 14 different soil types, the average temperature, and the
average rainfall. All these variables come from the spatial data obtained from IBGE9.
7IBGE Website: http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br
8IPEA Website: http://www.ipeadata.gov.br
9IBGE Website: http://www.ibge.gov.br
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5.1.6. Land Constraints
Four land constraints are considered and are added to the traditional deforestation
regressions along with their interaction with rural credit.
1. High population pressures: High population pressures are defined by munici-
palities that have a higher than average urban population density and a higher
than average rural population density.
2. Poor Soil Quality: Data on soil quality was obtained from shape files made
available by IBGE. Soil qualities were subsequently classified into high, medium,
and low soil quality. Municipalities with low soil quality more than one standard
deviation from the average are classified as being soil quality constrained.
3. Poor Transportation Infrastructure: Municipalities that spend no money on
the transportation sector fall in this category. The hypothesis being that these
municipalities will have a road network in poor condition resulting in higher
transportation costs.
4. High Areas of Cerrado: Municipalities with high areas of savanna are classified
into this category.
5.2. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the 741 municipalities are presented in Table 3. Based on
the summary statistics, on average 6% of forest cover is lost in a municipality every
year. Average urban and rural population densities appear to be very similar to the
average population densities of neighboring municipalities. Municipalities appear to
have varying degrees of agricultural activity. The number of cows range from less
than 1 per square kilometer up to 2205 per square kilometer. Similarly, hectares of
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land used for agriculture ranges from a low of 8 hectares to a high of 876 thousand
hectares. Not surprisingly, rural credit shows a similar range with the total stock
of rural credit ranging from less than 600 Brazilian reais to over 150 million reais
in a given municipality. Approximately 12% of municipalities meet the definition of
having high population pressures, 21% of municipalities meet the definition of having
low soil quality, 18% of observations meet the definition of having lower investments in
the transportation network, and 14% are characterized by high areas of cerrado. The
interactions show that municipalities that satisfy these constraints, on average receive
less credit than municipalities that do not satisfy these constraints. More detailed
information regarding variables used in the regression model and their sources are
presented in Table A1 on the Appendix.
6. Results and Interpretation
Results from the OLS regressions are presented in Table 4, Overall, the explanatory
variables provide a fairly good fit when looking at 741 municipalities with R2 val-
ues ranging from 0.38 to 0.41. Before testing the main hypothesis, in Regression 1,
all explanatory variables behave as expected according to the literature. Cow den-
sity and the percentage of land used for agriculture are positively correlated with
deforestation with a 1% increase being associated with a 0.51% and 0.63% increase
in the percentage of forest cover loss respectively. Both rural and neighboring rural
population densities are positively correlated with deforestation. On the other hand,
urban and neighboring urban population densities are negatively correlated. This is
not surprising because urban populations do not directly deforest land. It is impor-
tant to note that, while the coefficient on rural population densities is positive, it is
not statistically significant. It appears that neighboring rural population densities
are a stronger determinant of deforestation. The significance of neighboring rural
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: 2000-2010
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Deforest 7397 0.06 0.20 0.00 1.00
Area Planted 7397 14900.52 51387.67 8 875851
Cow Density 7397 45.97 101.69 0.00 2205.65
Transportation Expenditures 7397 513.40 1815.15 0.00 57544.84
Urban Density 7397 15.40 109.20 0.03 2122.31
Rural Density 7397 6.67 27.08 0.06 599.52
Neighboring Urban Density 7397 15.91 56.81 0.05 687.59
Neighboring Rural Density 7397 7.10 28.27 0.12 685.56
Credit 7397 3943.67 9882.62 0.57 150876.28
High Population Pressures 7397 0.12 0.33 0 1.00
Credit * High Population Pressures 7397 94.87 523.62 0 12768.60
Low Soil Quality 7397 0.21 0.40 0 1.00
Credit * Low Soil Quality 7397 417.72 1928.97 0 32340.42
High Cerrado Area 7397 0.18 0.38 0 1.00
Credit * High Cerrado Area 7397 1012.22 5491.53 0 101619.87
Low Transportation Expenditures 7397 0.14 0.34 0 1.00
Credit * Low Transport. Expenditures 7397 296.49 2335.14 0 87294.68
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Table 4: OLS Results - Deforestation as a Percentage of Forest Cover Loss10
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cow 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.96*** -0.01
Densityt−1 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12)
Area 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.34*
Plantedt−1 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.19)
Transportation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
Expenditurest−1 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Urban -0.25** -0.25** -0.23* -0.22* -0.15 -0.30
Densityt=2000 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.24)
Rural 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.14 -0.14 0.65*
Densityt=2000 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.39)
Neighboring -0.42*** -0.23* -0.42*** -0.23* -0.13 -0.29
Urban Densityt=2000 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.28)
Neighboring 0.59** 0.78*** 0.60** 0.80*** 0.96*** -0.17
Rural Densityt=2000 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.50)
Rural 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.44*** 0.53*** 0.25** 1.00***
Creditt−1 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.23)
High Population 3.02** 3.64*** 5.62*** -3.30
Pressures (1.33) (1.33) (1.57) (2.82)
Credit * High Pop- -0.92*** -1.05*** -1.32*** 0.15
ulation Pressurest−1 (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.44)
Low Soil -2.16* -2.61** -4.63*** 5.39**
Quality (1.12) (1.12) (1.35) (2.39)
Credit * Low 0.47*** 0.58*** 0.77*** -0.26
Soil Qualityt−1 (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.32)
High Cerrado -0.86 -2.96** 3.74
Area (1.20) (1.42) (2.81)
Credit * High -0.03 0.23 -0.49
Cerrado Areat−1 (0.16) (0.19) (0.35)
Low Transport. -0.18 -0.78* 1.11*
Expenditures (0.33) (0.40) (0.63)
Credit * Low Trans- -0.01 -0.13 0.25
port. Expenditurest−1 (0.13) (0.16) (0.27)
N 6656 6656 6656 6656 4440 1480
R2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.38
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*,**,*** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
10 Non-dummy variables are logged so coefficients represent elasticities
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population pressures might be capturing agricultural demand and/or deforestation
spillover by residents in adjacent municipalities. Expenditures on the transportation
network are insignificant but are positive in magnitude. The positive coefficient could
explain that municipalities that spend more on infrastructure ease access to forested
land and lower transportation costs. As expected, credit is positively correlated, with
a 1% increase in rural credit density being associated with a 0.54% increase in the
percentage of land deforested.
Regression 2 considers the land constraint defined by municipalities with high
population pressures for both urban and rural constituents. Approximately 12% of
municipalities satisfy the definition of this land constraint, While the direction of
most of the coefficients remain the same, it appears that under this new specification,
the magnitude of a few key variables change. First a 1% increase in neighboring
urban density is associated with a 0.23% decrease in the percentage of cleared forest
as opposed to 0.42% in Regression 1. The magnitude of the coefficients for both
neighboring rural densities and credit increase significantly as well. Most notably,
having both a high urban and rural population density is correlated with a more than
3% increase in the percentage of forest cover loss. When interacting this dummy
variable we see that a 1% increase in credit density given to municipalities with high
population pressures is associated with a 0.92% decrease in deforestation percent
in comparison to municipalities with lower population pressures. This decrease in
deforestation exceeds the coefficient of rural credit without the interaction term, where
a 1% increase in rural credit is associated with a 0.63% increase in deforestation.
In Regression 3, credit usage in municipalities with high percentages of low soil
quality is considered. While the coefficient on the dummy variable is insignificant,
after an interaction, it can be seen that a 1% increase in credit given to municipalities
with lower than average soil quality see a 0.58% increase in the percentage of forest
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loss. While this may seem contradictory to the findings in Regression 2, the findings
in Regression 3 suggest that credit incentivizes farmers to clear otherwise marginal
low quality land for agriculture. Regression 4 considers two other possible constraints
to deforestation: states with low quality transportation networks and states with a
high area percentage of cerrado land. Neither of the results are significant for the
dummy variable or the interaction term.
During the time period of the data, there were several notable events that may
have changed the structure of deforestation. In 2004, the government implemented
Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon,
which is said to be responsible for more than half of the reduction in deforestation
between 2005-2009. In addition, the government started to increase areas under
protection in 2004 as well (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012). In 2008, establishment of Decree
6,321 resulted in an increase in deforestation monitoring and regulations. World food
prices also showed a dramatic increase in 2008 creating a global crisis and causing
political and economical instability and social unrest in both poor and developed
nations. A chow test performed suggests structural differences in the determinants
of deforestation after 2008. But the null hypothesis of coefficient equality can not be
rejected for the year 2004 or other years.
After accounting for these structural differences and dropping 2008 observations,
it can be seen in Regression 5 that prior to 2008, a 1% increase in cow density is
correlated with a 0.96% increase in deforestation percent. This is almost twice the
impact suggested in previous regressions. Regression 6 indicates that after 2008, the
coefficient on cow density is negative and insignificant. Area planted is positively
correlated before and after 2008. Urban population densities and neighboring urban
population densities are no longer significant determinants of deforestation before
and after 2008. Rural population pressures are positively correlated with deforestation
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after 2008, while neighboring populations are positively correlated before 2008. Credit
is a significantly positive determinant of deforestation before and after 2008. When
we look at the affects of the land constraints, it can be seen that credit given to
municipalities with high population pressures is significantly characterized by lower
deforestation rates prior to 2008 but not after 2008. Credit given to municipalities
with high areas of poor soil are associated with higher deforestation rates prior to 2008.
The signs of a few of the dummy variables appear to switch after 2008, suggesting that
other dynamics played a key role in determining deforestation rates. More information
on crop prices and policies would be useful, but are not available to the author.
Robustness Checks
The specification of the dependent variable is changed in order to check the robustness
of the results and are presented in Table 5. In regressions 7 and 8, deforestation is
not normalized. Therefore deforestation is defined as follows:
De f orestationt = AreaDe f orestedt (14)
Regression 7 is run on observations obtained before 2008. While the magnitude of
several of the variables changes, the signs and significance stay the same for almost all
of the key variables. The only notable difference is that the coefficient on rural credit
is no longer significant. However, the significance and signs of credit interacted with
the land constraints remain the same, although, the magnitudes do differ. Regression
8, which contains observations after 2008, is also very similar to the results obtained
in previous regressions.
Regressions 9 and 10 look at the determinants of agricultural land expansion. The
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dependent variable is as follows:
De f orestationt =
AreaPlantedt
MunicipalityAreat
(15)
In Regression 9 we see that before 2008, the coefficients for population densities
behave as expected. Rural population densities are positively correlated with agri-
cultural land expansion, while all other population densities are negatively correlated
with agricultural land expansion. Similarly, municipalities with high urban and rural
population densities on average have more agricultural land. Higher levels of credit
are also associated with higher percentages of agricultural land cover. Credit used
in municipalities with more population pressures is associated with less agricultural
land expansion. Credit given to municipalities with low quality soil also see less agri-
cultural land expansion. This may be contradictory to the findings in the regressions
of Table 4, but it may be indicative of the fact that farmers use this marginal land for
livestock, rather than crops, which is not captured in this model. Unfortunately, data
on pastoral land area is limited, therefore regressions concerning the determinants of
pastoral land expansion are not run.
When including all the possible interactions between the resource constraints, the
signs of their aforementioned coefficients do not change for the indicator variables.
However the output suggests that a municipality that has more than one constraint,
may have a different impact on deforestation, in direction and in magnitude, than a
municipality with only one constraint. These results are presented in Table A2 of the
appendix, where due to the inconclusive nature, results after the year 2008 are not
included.
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Table 5: OLS Results - Deforestation Increments and Cropland Percent11
Explanatory Variable (7) (8) (9) (10)
Cow 1.53*** 0.01 0.03* -0.02
Densityt−1 (0.24) (0.24) (0.02) (0.02)
Area 1.14*** 0.57
Plantedt−1 (0.25) (0.39)
Transportation 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.01
Expenditurest−1 (0.05) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01)
Urban -0.20 -0.48 -0.05*** -0.01
Densityt=2000 (0.28) (0.48) (0.02) (0.03)
Rural -0.50 0.75 0.34*** 0.33***
Densityt=2000 (0.46) (0.79) (0.03) (0.06)
Neighboring -0.35 -0.61 -0.04** -0.08**
Urban Densityt=2000 (0.32) (0.56) (0.02) (0.04)
Neighboring 1.79*** -0.33 -0.22*** -0.26***
Rural Densityt=2000 (0.56) (0.99) (0.04) (0.07)
Rural 0.35 1.79*** 0.35*** 0.38***
Creditt−1 (0.24) (0.45) (0.01) (0.03)
High Population 10.02*** -6.16 0.82*** 1.01**
Pressures (3.05) (5.61) (0.19) (0.40)
Credit * High -2.61*** 0.30 -0.12*** -0.12*
Populationt−1 (0.50) (0.89) (0.03) (0.06)
Low Soil -10.14*** 9.05* 0.45*** 0.88***
Quality (2.62) (4.76) (0.16) (0.34)
Credit * Low 1.62*** -0.35 -0.08*** -0.13***
Soil Qualityt−1 (0.36) (0.63) (0.02) (0.04)
High Cerrado -5.11* 7.73 -1.40*** -1.69***
Area (2.76) (5.59) (0.17) (0.39)
Credit * High 0.33 -0.99 0.20*** 0.24***
Cerrado Areat−1 (0.37) (0.71) (0.02) (0.05)
Low Transport. -1.48* 2.15* -0.04 0.04
Expenditures (0.78) (1.26) (0.05) (0.09)
Credit*Low Trans- -0.20 0.54 -0.02 -0.04
port Expenditurest−1 (0.31) (0.53) (0.02) (0.04)
N 4440 1480 4440 1480
R2 0.46 0.45 0.65 0.58
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
*,**,*** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
11 Non-dummy variables are logged so coefficients represent elasticities
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7. Conclusions
The findings obtained in this study are robust to various specifications of the de-
pendent variable and lead to an interesting result in regards to rural credit: the
relationship between rural credit and deforestation is not as clear as suggested by the
extant literature. It is important to consider the fact that rural credit can be used
to invest in technologies that increase land and livestock industry productivity so
that expansion into the Brazilian Amazon need not take place. After accounting for
both rural and urban population density, rural credit stock can be associated with a
decrease in deforestation and agricultural land in municipalities with very high rural
populations as seen in Regressions 2, 4, 5, 7. 9, and 10, suggesting that rural credit in
these municipalities is used to increase productivity of previously cleared land. It is
also important to consider that since subsidized credit lowers clearing costs, farmers
may be incentivized to clear otherwise marginal land, as evidenced by the the positive
correlation between deforestation and credit interacted with low soil quality in regres-
sions 3, 4, 5, and 7. In addition regressions 9 and 10 suggest that rural credit given to
municipalities with low soil quality doesn’t lead to increases in cropland. This may
indicate that subsidized credit is used to clear this marginal land for pasture.
When looking at transportation expenditures as a proxy for road network quality,
no real conclusions can be made. Perhaps road density data would capture this con-
straint better and improve these results. However this data is not available. Having
high areas of cerrado also does not appear to change the rate of deforestation. This
might be because cerrado is not a strong constraint given that it too can be cleared
for agricultural activities. The insignificance of the cerrado constraint may imply that
clearing cerrado land is not any more attractive than clearing forests. Future studies
would include information concerning prices and polices during this time period to
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test if these results still hold. It would also be interesting to separate the affects of
credit given for crops versus credit given for livestock on deforestation rates.
The conclusions from this study have several policy implications. In developing
countries there is often a lack of environmental awareness and management during
periods of industrialization and population growth. Effective implementation of en-
vironmental policies in credit lending programs can lower the risk associated with
natural disasters, climate change, and resource scarcity by setting additional land
constraints. Currently most lending institutions overemphasize achieving financial
sustainability in short term periods rather than looking at the long run implications
of environmental impacts. Lending institutions have a unique opportunity to stim-
ulate development while addressing environmental concerns. Findings suggest that
rural credit does not always lead to increases in deforestation and an across the board
decrease in rural credit will not maximize social welfare. It is important to disentan-
gle what motivates farmers to clear land. As a follow up to this study, additional
farm-level research can be obtained to determine characteristics of farmers that use
credit to invest in productivity increasing technology and inputs rather than expand
their current land holdings. Variables such as age, education level, access to informa-
tion, and land constraints should all be considered and may play an important role
in technology adoption.
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Chapter 2: Biofuel Crop Acreage Response to Rural Credit
Availability
1. Introduction
In 2013, Brazil produced over 7 billion liquid gallons of ethanol, making the nation the
second largest producer and exporter of ethanol fuel (USDA - FAS). The expansion of
biofuel production has caused concerns regarding land-use change. Acreage devoted
to biofuel crop production can compete with cropland used for food and natural
ecosystems, leading to increased food prices and to loss of biodiversity and carbon
sinks (Rosegrant, 2008; Searchinger et al., 2008). Land-use changes are thought to be
both direct, such as when land is used to grow sugarcane itself; and indirect, such as
when land pushes up world commodity prices increasing acreage conversion in other
crops (Hausman, 2012). Brazil has several areas of ecological importance that have
been threatened by agricultural expansion including the Amazon, Atlantic Forest,
and Cerrado (Ratter et al., 1997; Tabarelli et al., 2005; Cardille and Foley, 2003).
The first essay highlights the impacts of rural credit on deforestation in the Legal
Amazon Region. Other papers on the effects of Brazilian rural credit and land-
use focus almost exclusively on the impacts credit has on deforestation in the Legal
Amazon region. These papers all reach the general conclusion that rural credit, which
is usually priced at below market rates, contributes to deforestation by acting as a
subsidy, and thus, encourages land expansion (Andersen, 1996; Pfaff, 1999; Branda˜o
and Souza, 2006; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013; Prates, 2008; Prates and Bacha,
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2012; Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2013).
Understanding the effects of rural credit and land-use outside the Legal Amazon is
particularly relevant since according to Figure 5 , credit per square kilometer is most
concentrated in the Atlantic Forest (Mata Atlantica), Pampa, and Cerrado regions of
Brazil. The Amazon is not the only region in Brazil of ecological importance. Along
the coast and inland areas of the south is a drier tropical forest known as the Atlantic
Forest, of which approximately 90% has been cleared. About 50% of the tropical
grassland known as cerrado has been destroyed by human settlement, cropland, and
pastoral land (Mongabay, 2015). Similarly the inland wetlands of pantanal are also
of importance. Therefore, these areas should also be considered in land-use change
analyses.
This chapter seeks to provide a more comprehensive analysis by considering the
impacts of rural credit on land use change across all regions of Brazil. The Brazil-
ian government only collects detailed deforestation data for the Amazon, therefore,
changes in crop acreage over time is used as a proxy for environmental degradation.
The responsiveness of crop acreage to changes in rural credit availability is analyzed
with a particualr emphasis on biofuel crops through the use of a dynamic model
based on expectations. The effects of the variation in rural credit avalability on crop
acreage, which is referred to as availability risk, is also considered. To the author’s
knowledge, rural credit has not been included in an acreage response model.
2. Background
The history of ethanol fuel in Brazil dates back to the 1970s when the first oil crisis
resulted in gasoline shortages and increased awareness of the dangers of oil dependence
(Geller, 1985). The National Alcohol Program, Pro´ A´lcool, was launched in 1975 to
phase out fossil fuels used to power automobiles in favor of ethanol produced from
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sugarcane. The program instituted mandatory blends resulting in minimums ranging
from 10% to 22% (Geller, 1985; Pousa et al., 2007).
In 1979 neat ethanol-powered cars, which run on 100% blends of ethanol, entered
the market. The sale of ethanol-powered cars quickly exceeded that of fossil-fuel-
powered cars until the mid-1980s when oil prices fell (Szwarc, 2004). Ethanol and oil
price fluctuations eventually created a market for flex-fuel cars capable of using any
blend of gasoline and ethanol. Since their inception in 2003, over 20 million flex-fuel
cars and trucks have been manufactured. By 2006 the manufacturing of flex-fuel light
vehicles outpaced that of gas-powered vehicles due to minimum blend requirements
(De Freitas and Kaneko, 2011). The invention of flex-fuel vehicles, higher blend
requirements, and rising gas prices led to a substitution away from gasoline and an
increase in the consumption of ethanol fuels. By 2012, flex-fuel vehicles represented
more than 85% of passenger vehicles sold in Brazil. Figure 6 shows the recent sale
history of cars by fuel-type in Brazil coupled with fuel ethanol consumption.
In 2003, the mandatory blend limits were fixed at a maximum of 25% and a
minimum of 20% by volume (Rico and Andrea, 2008). Since then, however, supply
shortages have resulted in reductions of the minimum blend and the need to import
biofuels from other countries such as the United States. Due to this increase in
demand coupled with a supply shortage, the government of Brazil has sought to
increase biofuel production including policies aimed to increase the amount of rural
credit available to sugarcane producers at lower interest rates (USDA - FAS; Rural
Credit Manual, 2014).
Throughout this paper rural credit refers to official credit used for investing in,
marketing, and producing agricultural commodities. Approximately 30% of Brazil’s
agriculture and livestock resources are funded by rural credit (Ministe´rio da Agricul-
tura, Pecua´ria e Abastecimento, 2003). Rural credit is disbursed through the National
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Figure 6: Brazilian Car Sales and Ethanol Consumption
Source: ANFAVEA (2014)
System of Rural Credit (Sistema Nacional de Cre´dito Rural, or SNCR) and adminis-
tered by the Central Bank, private banks, and credit cooperatives according to rules
and conditions established in the Central Bank’s Manual of Rural Credit (Manual
de Cre´dito Rural). In addition to the SNCR, farmers can access additional credit
from other private sources such as traders, processors, and input manufacturers. The
primary goals of the SNCR include providing credit for investments in programs to
boost competitiveness; measures to support agricultural production and marketing;
and programs to generate employment, income, and modernization of agriculture (As-
sunc¸a˜o et al., 2013; Ministe´rio da Agricultura, Pecua´ria e Abastecimento, 2003).
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3. Literature Review
Two main branches of economic literature exist when evaluating the contribution of
biofuels to land-use change. The first, utilizes equilibrium models to project the effects
of biofuel production on global land-use and agricultural commodity markets. The
second branch of literature uses regression analyses to understand how key variables
influence biofuel crop yield and acreage. These regression analyses can be used to cap-
ture the recursive nature of farmer decisions, and do not rely heavily on assumptions
regarding market structure as done in equilibrium models.
3.1. Biofuels and land-use Change in Equilibrium Models
In the literature, a number of economic equilibrium models (e.g. FASOM, FAPRI,
GTAP, IMPACT, MIRAGE) have been utilized. These models consist of a series of
equations that realistically represent an economy. The equations are calibrated to
economic data and are adjusted to represent various policy changes and economic
shocks. For example, Edwards et al. (2010) compare direct and indirect land-use
change following an increase in EU and US demand for biofuels using various partial
and general equilibrium models. They conclude that an increase for biodiesel in the
EU results in a larger share of land-use change outside the EU. Five of their models
find that an increase in US demand for ethanol results in the majority of land-use
change occurring outside the US, while one model suggests that 90% of land-use
change occurs within the US.
Using a CGE model, Hertel et al. (2010) find that by 2015, a third of US crop
growth will be attributed to EU biofuel mandates. Similarly, combined US and EU
policies will result in an even greater impact on land-use in other economies. Their
results show that Latin America, Africa, and Oceania will experience a sharp increase
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in cropland acreage at the expense of forests and pastureland. Furthermore, several
papers provide the next logical step by calculating greenhouse gas emissions associated
with direct and indirect land-use change from biofuel crop expansion (Dumortier et al.,
2011).
Specifically, in the Brazilian context, Nagavarapu (2010) incorporates labor deci-
sions, sugarcane ethanol production processes, and the import-export markets into a
CGE. Estimates indicate that higher world prices of oil and agricultural goods would
lead to dramatic land clearing. Similarly, in a CGE model by Ferreira Filho and
Horridge (2014), they find that each new hectare of sugarcane requires 0.14 hectares
of new land and 0.47 hectares of land converted from pasture, suggesting that policies
limiting deforestation are unlikely to prevent greater ethanol production. Also, re-
gional differences in sugarcane productivity are found to be important determinants
of land-use change and sugarcane expansion.
3.2. Biofuel Acreage Response Models
One of the earliest regression models of acreage response was developed by Nerlove
(1956). The Nerlove model assumes that farmers formulate beliefs based on expecta-
tions of future crop prices. Thus, the expectations about prices are a function of ob-
served prices in previous time periods. The assumption leads to a partial-adjustment
model, in which acreage in the current period is a function of last year’s acreage as
well as prices during the previous year’s harvest (Askari and Cummings, 1977).
The Nerlove model consists of four equations:
ADt = α0 + α1P
e
t + α2tUt (16)
Pet = P
e
t−1 + δ(Pt−1 − Pet−1) (17)
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At = At−1 + γ(A∗t − At−1) (18)
Ut ∼iid (0, σ2u) (19)
Where At = actual area under cultivation at time t
ADt = area desired to be under cultivation at time t
Pt = actual price at time t
Pet = expected price at time t
Ut = is the error term at time t
Equation 16 shows the relationship between the acreage a farmer wants and the
expected price. Economic theory suggests that α1 ≥ 0. Equations 17 and 18 display
a farmers adaptive expectations of price after observing price and acreage in the
previous time period. Solving equations 16 - 19 yield, the following model can easily
be estimated econometrically:
At = β1 + β2Pt−1 + β3At−1 + β4At−2 + et (20)
Where β1 = α0γδ
β2 = α1γδ
β3 = (1− γ) + (1− δ)
β4 = −(1− γ)(1− δ)
et = δUt − [δ(1− γ)]Ut−1
Other literature has expanded on the Nerlove model. In a study by Gardner
(1976), futures prices are incorporated into the partial-adjustment framework. Gard-
ner (1976) argues that futures prices are a better measure of farmer expectations than
lagged harvest prices. Pandey et al. (1984) include data regarding rainfall and irri-
gation in an analysis of Haryana, India. In a model by Sangwan (1985), technology
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is accounted for. Chavas and Holt (1990) include a variable that measures price risk
into the Nerlove model, finding that risk plays an important role in soybean and corn
acreage decisions in the United States. Similarly, Lin and Dismukes (2007) incor-
porate yield risk into the model for major crops in the North-Central region of the
United States. Lee and Helmberger (1985) formulate a supply response function in
the presence of changing farm programs. Thus, the main adaptations relate generally
to the inclusion of non-price variables in the Nerlovian model.
There are several other papers that use the Nerlovian framework with a particular
focus on biofuel crops. Huang and Khanna (2010) analyze the impacts of climate,
and crop prices on U.S. corn, wheat, and soybean yields during the 1977-2007 time
period. They find that corn, soybean, and wheat yields all respond positively to
their own prices. They also find that high temperatures reduce yields for all crops,
and increased precipitation enhances corn and soybean yield. In a similar analysis,
Sechrist (2010) finds that the U.S. land-use system has substantial inertia, and current
land-use is highly dependent on past land-use. He finds that the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable has a significant impact on the magnitude of corn, wheat, and
soybean price elastcities. Xie et al. (2013) predict land coverage in the Midwest for
the new bioenergy crop miscanthus using fine-scale data and a simulation of optimal
crop location. They incorporate the observations into a Nerlove model and find that
if miscanthus were to cover 5% of the landscape, 80% of the land miscanthus would
occupy, is currently not used for food crops.
Analyses on developing countries are more limited in number, however, Lau (2009)
looks at palm oil production in six countries finding that own price and price of
vegetable oils do not significantly influence the demand for palm oil area harvested.
The pattern of oil palm area harvested varies by country, the distinctive features
of which are influenced by political stability and government intervention. Finally,
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in an extensive regression analysis, Hausman (2012) finds ethanol crop acreage in
Brazil is responsive to expectations of future yield and output prices. In addition,
the acreage of soybeans responds more to price shocks than sugarcane and all other
crops. Furthermore, Hausman (2012) compares her results to those obtained in the
equilibrium literature.
4. Model
The primary contribution of this paper to the extant literature is the inclusion of two
new variables into the acreage response framework, namely a measure of credit avail-
ability and credit availability risk. To correct for potential selection bias a two-step
method is employed. The first step consists of a logit model wherein the dependent
variable, D, indicates whether or not county i decides to plant a particular crop in
year t:
Di,t = f (Di,t−1, PCi,t−1, PSi,t−1, PRi,t,YRi,t,Ci,t−1,CRi,t) (21)
Variables used to describe a county’s decision to participate include PC the logged
county level price of the crop, PS a vector of prices for substitute crops, PR the log of
county price risk, YR the log of county yield risk, C the log of credit availability, and
CR the log of credit availability risk. The primary benefit of using a logit specification
in the first step is that it allows for the inclusion of fixed effects.
The second step is the estimation of the traditional Nerlove model wherein crop
acreage is a function of acreage and prices observed in the previous time period as
well as other explanatory variables. In this instance, the model is only estimated on
counties that plant the crop at time period t. The inverse mills ratio from the logit
model is calculated and included as an explanatory variable in the second step. In
the case of a logit model, the inverse mills ratio is the ratio of the probability density
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function and the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution evaluated at
the predicted outcomes of Xβ. The predicted outcomes are divided by the standard
error of the logit estimation. This process produces parameters that are applicable
for all counties, correcting the selection bias. Usually the inverse mills ratio is used
to correct for selection bias after employing a probit model, however its inclusion is
not uncommon following implementation of a logit model (Hausman, 2012).
The dependent variable in the second step, A, is the logged county acreage of a
given crop as seen in equation 22 below:
Ai,t =γ1Ai,t−1 + γ2Ai,t−2 + β1PCi,t−1 + β2PSi,t−1 + β3ASi,t−1
+ β4PRi,t + β5YRi,t + β6Ci,t−1 + β7CRi,t + λts + vi + µt + εi,t
(22)
Where AS is logged county level substitute crop acreages, λ denotes the inverse mills
ratio, v is a vector of municipality specific fixed effects, and µ is a vector of time fixed
effects.
In the model credit availability is defined as the amount of credit per square
kilometer of land suitable for agriculture in a given municipality:
Ci,t =
Crediti,t
Areai
(23)
Similar to what is done in the literature, credit availability risk is defined as the
weighted sum of the squared deviation of average credit availability from current
availability for the previous three periods:
CRt = 0.5(AC− Ct−1)2 + 0.3(AC− Ct−2)2 + 0.2(AC− Ct−3)2 (24)
where average credit is calculated by a moving average, AC = Ct−1+Ct−2+Ct−33 . Corre-
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spondingly, price risk refers to the weighted sum of the squared deviation of average
prices observed in the previous three periods, and yield risk refers to the weighted
sum of the squared deviation of average yields observed in the previous three time
periods.
The second step will be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). It is
acknowledged that OLS is biased in the presence of a lagged dependent variable.
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) regressions are often used to correct for this
bias in a panel data series, but can have several drawbacks when employed in Nerlove
models. Firstly, standard errors from GMM analyses can be high especially when T
is not sufficiently large. Additionally, the use of lagged acreage as an instrument is
problematic, since as one would expect, the coefficient is often close to unity making
it a weak instrument (Stock et al., 2002). For this reason, OLS continues to be
regularly used in the applied agricultural economic literature when employing the
Nerlove model.
The results from the second step will be compared to the agriculture system in
aggregate. This information may be of interest to policy makers, who would rather
make a policy that affects all crops equally. In this case the equation to be estimated
will have total agricultural acreage, AT, as the dependent variable:
ATi,t =γ1Ai,t−1γ2Ai,t−2 + β1PCi,t−1 + β2PSi,t−1 + β3ASi,t−1
+ β4PRi,t + β5YRi,t + β6Ci,t−1 + β7CRi,t + λts + vi + εi,t
(25)
5. Data
This paper uses municipality-level panel data from the years 1993 to 2004. Since
Brazil is composed of several biomes, agricultural production processes and harvest
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seasons vary greatly throughout the country (Hausman, 2012). Regressions will be
run separately for six regions within Brazil, to account for structural differences in the
crop production functions. The geographical regions in this analysis, which are not
totally inclusive nor mutually exclusive, include the Southeast, South, Center-West,
Amazon-Border, Amazon-Interior, and Coastal Northeast.
The Southeast is the primary sugarcane and ethanol producer for Brazil and is
composed of the states of Sa˜o Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Esp´ırito
Santo in this analysis. Soybeans are also a major crop in this region. The South is
another agricultural region made up of the states of Parana´, Santa Catarina, and Rio
Grande do Sul. Soybeans are increasingly produced in the states of Mato Grosso,
Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goia´s which make up the Center-West. The states of
Mato Grosso, Tocantins, and Maranha˜o define the Amazon Border; these states are
mostly comprised of savannah. The Amazon-Interior is comprised of the states of
Rondoˆnia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para´, and Amapa´. This area is characterized
by high transportation costs, low soil quality, and tropical forest. Sugarcane is a main
crop produced in the states of Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Para´ıba, Rio Grande
do Norte, and Ceara´ which define the Coastal Northeast. Table 6 shows summary
statistics of the crops that will be analyzed across the regions.
5.1. Crop Acreage
Annual data on agricultural crop acreage has been obtained from the Brazilian In-
stitute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica,
or IBGE). There is often substitutability and complementarity between biofuel and
food crops, for this reason beans, coffee, soybeans, rice, and wheat acreage will be
compared to that of sugarcane.
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5.2. Rural Credit
This paper only considers the effect of official rural credit disbursed through the
SNCR due to lack of data availability regarding private lending practices. Official
rural credit can be directed toward financing crop and livestock production, as well
as capital investments in agricultural infrastructure and equipment. Data on credit
comes from the Central Bank of Brazil’s (Banco Central do Brasil, or BCB)1 Annual
Rural Credit Yearbook (Anua´rio Estat´ıstico do Cre´dito Rural). All observations are
normalized into reais in the year 2000 and are divided by municipality area minus the
area of land not suitable for agriculture.
5.3. Crop Prices
Information about crop spot prices is available on a monthly basis from the Institute
for Applied Economic Research on a monthly basis (Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica
Aplicada, or IPEA). Crop prices included in the regression analyses are crop prices
at the time of harvest in the previous year. Harvest periods do differ across regions,
and this is taken into account.
5.4. Other Variables
Other variables for which data is obtained include yield variables, climate variables,
population variables, and proxies for transportation costs, namely distances to state
and federal capitals. All these variables come from IPEA.
1BCB Website: http://www.bcb.gov.br/
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6. Results and Interpretation
The participation results from the the first step of the acreage response model are
presented in Tables 7 and 8. As would be expected, having planted sugarcane or
soybean in the previous two time periods significantly increases the probability that
the crop will be planted in the current time period in the majority of cases. An
interesting result obtained in the first stage is that in the Southeast, higher sugarcane
prices observed in the previous time period significantly decreases the probability
that sugarcane will be planted in subsequent time periods. This may be due to new
technologies that increase efficiency of sugarcane production. Similarly, government
support to increase the production of this biofuel crop. Both scenarios may make
it such that farmers do not follow market price incentives when deciding whether or
not to plant sugarcane . The Southeast produces the majority of Brazil’s sugarcane,
which may explain why these effects are not observed in other regions.
Increases in yield risk appear to increase the probability that both soybean and
sugarcane will be planted in subsequent time periods. Price risk generally increases
the probability that soybean acreage will be planted in all observed regions, whereas,
the sugarcane results are more mixed. For both crops, increases in rural credit avail-
ability increases the probability that the crop will be planted in the next time period.
Increases in availability risk significantly decreases the probability that sugarcane
will be planted in the Southeast, South, Center-West an Coastal Northeast. Soybean
acreage significantly decreases when risk is high in southern Brazil. No regions ex-
hibit significant increases in participation probability for either crop as credit risk
increases.
Tables 9 and 10 display the output of key variables from the sugarcane and soybean
production functions obtained in the second step. The results are generally consistent
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Table 7: Rural Credit Effects on Sugarcane Participation - Logit Model
Southeast South Center-West AmazonInterior
Coastal
Northeast
Own 4.297*** 4.598*** 4.512*** 5.428*** 5.072***
Participation
(t-1)
(36.68) (30.87) (26.83) (13.56) (28.17)
Own 1.389*** 1.899*** 1.191*** 0.125 1.273***
Participation
(t-2)
(10.50) (12.18) (5.80) (0.26) (5.40)
Own Price -6.880*** 2.067 -3.481 2.583 0.229
(-4.55) (1.00) (-0.44) (0.47) (0.23)
Own Price -0.090 0.292 2.127** -0.106 -0.591***
Risk (-0.58) (1.51) (2.01) (-0.32) (-3.68)
Own Yield 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.011** 0.010 0.039***
Risk (7.11) (5.65) (2.47) (1.16) (9.10)
Credit 0.057*** 0.155*** 0.012 0.045*** 0.087**
Availability (4.40) (4.81) (0.42) (2.90) (2.22)
Credit -0.025*** -0.062*** -0.018* -0.005 -0.047***
Risk (-6.11) (-9.72) (-1.87) (-0.94) (-8.02)
N 16660 11590 4450 3100 9340
Psuedo-R2 0.703 0.771 0.706 0.712 0.818
All regressions include lagged bean price, bean acreage, coffee price, coffee acreage,
soy price, soy acreage, rice price, rice acreage, wheat price, wheat acreage, rice price,
and rice acreage. Population characteristics, distance to state and federal capitals,
climate variables state trends, and year fixed effects are also included.
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level
respectively
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Table 8: Rural Credit Effects on Soybean Participation - Logit Model
Southeast South CenterWest
Amazon
Interior
Coastal
Northeast
Own 3.426*** 3.813*** 3.433*** 4.737*** 3.411***
Participation
(t-1)
(33.35) (25.8) (20.56) (10.54) (20.43)
Own 0.608*** 1.180*** 1.047*** -0.034 1.044***
Participation
(t-2)
(4.41) (6.87) (4.21) (-0.05) (4.19)
Own Price 9.625 2.252*** -0.089 19.702 -0.096
(0.95) (3.14) (-0.39) (1.28) (-0.42)
Own Price 0.463 0.544*** 0.182*** 0.569 0.184***
Risk (0.29) (3.06) (2.85) (0.78) (2.88)
Own Yield 0.040*** 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.054*** 0.038***
Risk (10.32) (4.81) (5.31) (3.16) (5.15)
Credit 0.362*** 0.253*** 0.320*** 0.198** 0.295***
Availability (9.93) (5.60) (5.67) (2.45) (4.97)
Credit 0.007 -0.038*** 0.001 0.011 -0.001
Risk (0.92) (-7.02) (0.13) (1.36) (-0.14)
N 14980 11590 4820 2940 4820
Psuedo-R2 0.688 0.779 0.681 0.570 0.682
All regressions include lagged bean price, bean acreage, coffee price, coffee acreage,
sugarcane price, sugarcane acreage, rice price, rice acreage, wheat price, wheat
acreage, rice price, and rice acreage. Population characteristics, distance to state and
federal capitals, climate variables state trends, and year fixed effects are also included.
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level
respectively
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with economic theory and the literature. Both sugarcane and soybean land-use are
highly dependent on previous land-use, as own lagged acreage observed in the previous
two time periods is positively correlated and, in most cases, highly significant with
land-use in the current time period. This is theoretically sound as there is substantial
cost associated with a farmer’s decision to switch to another crop, thus specialization
is more profitable.
While own price elasticities tend to be positive, there are a few instances where
they are not. In the case of sugar, the coefficient for own price elasticity is nega-
tive in the Southeast and Amazon Interior, however both coefficients are statistically
insignificant. For soybean, own price elasticity is negative and significant in the Ama-
zon Border. This may be due to limitations of the data. Also, the Amazonian region
is characterized by subsistence farming, which may partially explain why farmers do
not respond to the same price incentives as other regions — these farmers are more
likely to farm for self-consumption.
One interesting result that can be observed in the tables is the differences in the
responses to yield risk. When looking at yield risk, sugarcane is uniformly associated
with municipalities that are characterized with risk seeking behavior; higher acreages
of sugarcane are associated with higher levels of risk. On the other hand, most regions
tend to plant less soybeans when soybean yield risk increases. Price risk results also
tend to vary by crop and region. These differences in risk behavior may be due to
government support as well as insurance programs that differ across crops.
When looking at the effects of rural credit, increases in rural credit availability
is associated with increases in both sugarcane and soybean acreage. Both crops are
characterized by a mixture of risk averse and risk seeking behavior in the presence of
increased rural credit risk.
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Table 9: Effects of Rural Credit on Sugarcane Acreage - OLS
Southeast South CenterWest
Amazon
Interior
Coastal
Northeast
Amazon
Border
Own Lagged 0.219*** 0.186*** 0.430*** 0.099*** 0.445*** 0.346***
Acreage (0.011) (0.012) (0.029) (0.016) (0.028) (0.009)
Own Lagged 0.063*** 0.047*** 0.053*** -0.007 0.049*** 0.060***
Acreaged (t-2) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
Own Yield 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.017***
Risk (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Own Price -0.578 0.600 2.274** -0.732 1.725*** 0.558***
(0.839) (0.592) (1.091) (0.824) (0.298) (0.089)
Own Price 0.094** -0.161*** 0.990*** -0.101 0.067* 0.068***
Risk (0.042) (0.056) (0.258) (0.081) (0.040) (0.013)
Credit 0.068*** 0.129*** 0.091*** 0.037*** 0.031 0.080***
Availability (0.015) (0.020) (0.033) (0.012) (0.020) (0.008)
Credit -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.018 0.006* -0.017*** -0.016***
Risk (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
N 11573 7259 2374 1413 4231 31399
R 0.669 0.542 0.626 0.369 0.776 0.674
All variables are logged so coefficients are elasticities. In all regressions lagged
substitute crop prices, lagged substitute crop acreage, year-fixed effects, municipality
characteristics, and state trends are included.
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level
respectively
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Table 10: Effects of Rural Credit on Soybean Acreage - OLS
Southeast South CenterWest
Amazon
Interior
Coastal
Northeast
Amazon
Border
Own Lagged 0.027*** 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.047 0.032*** 0.065***
Acreage (4.65) (0.007) (0.009) (0.030) (0.009) (0.004)
Own Lagged 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.022*** -0.017 0.022*** 0.020***
Acreaged (t-2) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.002)
Own Yield -0.007* -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.010 -0.027*** -0.017***
Risk (-2.44) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
Own Price 0.896 0.449*** 3.930** 1.292** -0.074** 0.460***
(1.76) (0.135) (1.716) (0.622) (0.031) (0.089)
Own Price -0.817 -0.099*** 0.038 -0.132 0.028 -0.066***
Risk (-1.63) (0.034) (0.049) (0.239) (0.020) (0.011)
Credit 0.067* 0.121*** 0.185*** 0.105 0.187*** 0.121***
Availability (2.50) (0.018) (0.025) (0.100) (0.035) (0.011)
Credit 0.016* -0.006** 0.008 0.010 0.004 0.005**
Risk (2.13) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.002)
N 3638 7336 2560 207 1065 15130
R2 0.791 0.867 0.869 0.601 0.860 0.835
All variables are logged so coefficients are elasticities. In all regressions lagged
substitute crop prices, lagged substitute crop acreage, year-fixed effects, municipality
characteristics, and state trends are included.
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level
respectively
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6.1. Regional Differences of Biofuel Crop Elasticities
Table 11 and 12 show the results of z-tests used to compare the coefficients of the
sugarcane and soybean models across the observed regions. According to Table 12,
in the case of soybeans, the Center-West region is significantly more responsive to
increases in rural credit availability in comparison to the southern region. A 10%
increase in credit availability is associated with a 18.5% increase in soybean acreage
in the Center-West and a standard deviation of 0.025, but only a 12.1% increase in
the South with a standard deviation of 0.018. Similarly, the Amazon Border is more
responsive than the South with an 18.7% increase in soybean acreage for every 10%
increase in availability and a 0.035 standard error. The South also has statistically
different responses to increases in rural credit risk in comparison to the Center-West
and the Southeast. The converse is true in the South, but decreases in the Center-
West and Southeast.
Table 11 indicates that sugarcane acreage is more responsive in the South to rural
credit availability in comparison to the Southeast, Amazon Interior, and Coastal
Northeast, seeing a 12.9% increase in sugarcane acreage for every 10% increase in rural
credit. The Southeast and Amazon Interior are associated with a 6.8% and a 3.7%
increase respectively. The Coastal Northeast is correlated with a 3.1% increase, but
the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Response to rural credit availability risk is
statistically different in the Amazon Interior from the Southeast, South, Center-West,
and Coastal Northeast. As availability risk increases, sugarcane acreage increases in
the Amazon Interior. In the South, Southeast, Center-west, and Coastal Northeast
sugarcane acreage is correlated with increases for when risk increases.
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6.2. Differences in Major Crop Elasticities Within Regions
Tables B1 through B6 in the appendix provide the results of the z-tests used to
compare the effects of rural credit availability and availability risk across the six
major Brazilian crops within the specified regions.
In the Southeast, coffee is statistically more responsive than beans, sugarcane, rice
and wheat to increases in rural credit availability seeing a 20.3% increase in coffee
acreage for every 10% increase in rural credit. According to the regression results in
the Southeast, beans see a 9.5% increase in acreage for a 10% increase in credit, sug-
arcane a 6.8% increase, rice a 8.3% increase, and wheat a 1.5% increase. No statistical
conclusion can be made when comparing coffee to soybeans, however. Statistically,
coffee sees the greatest decreases in acreage when availability risk increases. Sugar-
cane acreage is associated with greater decreases in comparison to beans and soybean
acreage as availability risk increases.
In the South, wheat is statistically less responsive to increases in rural credit
availability than rice, beans, soybeans and sugar, seeing only a 0.8% increase in wheat
acreage for every 10% increase in rural credit . In contrast rice, beans, soybeans and
sugar increase by 16.8%, 14.6%, 12.1%, and 12.9% respectively. No conclusion can be
made when comparing wheat to coffee. As availability risk increases bean acreage is
associated with greater decreases in acreage in comparison to sugar, wheat and soy.
Coffee sees greater decreases in acreage in comparison to sugar and wheat. Similarly,
as risk increases, rice and sugarcane acreage decreases more-so than soy and wheat
acreage.
In the Center-West, coffee is statistically less responsive to increases in rural credit
availability in comparison to beans, soy, sugar, and rice. A 10% increase in credit
availability is correlated with a 0.4% increase in coffee acreage, a 17.2% increase in
55
Ta
bl
e
11
:
C
om
pa
ris
on
Te
st
in
g
of
Ru
ra
lC
re
di
t
Eff
ec
ts
on
Su
ga
rc
an
e
A
cr
ea
ge
A
cr
os
s
R
eg
io
ns
(a
)
R
ur
al
C
re
di
t
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
R
eg
io
n
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
Er
ro
r
Z
St
at
ist
ic
P-
va
lu
e
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
8*
**
0.
01
5
-2
.4
40
0.
01
5
So
ut
h
0.
12
9*
**
0.
02
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
8*
**
0.
01
5
-0
.6
34
0.
52
6
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
09
1*
**
0.
03
3
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
8*
**
0.
01
5
1.
61
4
0.
10
7
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
03
7*
**
0.
01
2
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
8*
**
0.
01
5
1.
48
0
0.
13
9
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
03
1
0.
02
So
ut
h
0.
12
9*
**
0.
02
0.
98
5
0.
32
5
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
09
1*
**
0.
03
3
So
ut
h
0.
12
9*
**
0.
02
3.
94
4
0.
00
0
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
03
7*
**
0.
01
2
So
ut
h
0.
12
9*
**
0.
02
3.
46
5
0.
00
1
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
03
1
0.
02
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
09
1*
**
0.
03
3
1.
53
8
0.
12
4
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
03
7*
**
0.
01
2
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
09
1*
**
0.
03
3
1.
55
5
0.
12
0
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
03
1
0.
02
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
03
7*
**
0.
01
2
0.
25
7
0.
79
7
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
03
1
0.
02
(b
)
R
ur
al
C
re
di
t
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
R
isk
R
eg
io
n
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
Er
ro
r
Z
St
at
ist
ic
P-
va
lu
e
So
ut
he
as
t
-0
.0
13
**
*
0.
00
3
1.
20
0
0.
23
0
So
ut
h
-0
.0
19
**
*
0.
00
4
So
ut
he
as
t
-0
.0
13
**
*
0.
00
3
0.
43
9
0.
66
1
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
-0
.0
18
0.
01
1
So
ut
he
as
t
-0
.0
13
**
*
0.
00
3
-4
.4
78
0.
00
0
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
00
6*
0.
00
3
So
ut
he
as
t
-0
.0
13
**
*
0.
00
3
0.
68
6
0.
49
3
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
-0
.0
17
**
*
0.
00
5
So
ut
h
-0
.0
19
**
*
0.
00
4
-0
.0
85
0.
93
2
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
-0
.0
18
0.
01
1
So
ut
h
-0
.0
19
**
*
0.
00
4
-5
.0
00
0.
00
0
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
00
6*
0.
00
3
So
ut
h
-0
.0
19
**
*
0.
00
4
-0
.3
12
0.
75
5
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
-0
.0
17
**
*
0.
00
5
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
-0
.0
18
0.
01
1
-2
.1
05
0.
03
5
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
00
6*
0.
00
3
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
-0
.0
18
0.
01
1
-0
.0
83
0.
93
4
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
-0
.0
17
**
*
0.
00
5
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
00
6*
0.
00
3
3.
94
4
0.
00
0
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
-0
.0
17
**
*
0.
00
5
56
Ta
bl
e
12
:
C
om
pa
ris
on
Te
st
in
g
of
Ru
ra
lC
re
di
t
Eff
ec
ts
on
So
yb
ea
n
A
cr
ea
ge
A
cr
os
s
R
eg
io
ns
(a
)
R
ur
al
C
re
di
t
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
R
eg
io
n
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
Er
ro
r
Z
St
at
ist
ic
P-
va
lu
e
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
7*
2.
5
-0
.0
22
0.
98
3
So
ut
h
0.
12
1*
**
0.
01
8
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
7*
2.
5
-0
.0
47
0.
96
2
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
18
5*
**
0.
02
5
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
7*
2.
5
-0
.0
15
0.
98
8
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
10
5
0.
1
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
06
7*
2.
5
-0
.0
48
0.
96
2
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
18
7*
**
0.
03
5
So
ut
h
0.
12
1*
**
0.
01
8
-2
.0
78
0.
03
8
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
18
5*
**
0.
02
5
So
ut
h
0.
12
1*
**
0.
01
8
0.
15
7
0.
87
5
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
10
5
0.
1
So
ut
h
0.
12
1*
**
0.
01
8
-1
.6
77
0.
09
4
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
18
7*
**
0.
03
5
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
18
5*
**
0.
02
5
0.
77
6
0.
43
8
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
10
5
0.
1
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
18
5*
**
0.
02
5
-0
.0
46
0.
96
3
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
18
7*
**
0.
03
5
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
10
5
0.
1
-0
.7
74
0.
43
9
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
18
7*
**
0.
03
5
(b
)
R
ur
al
C
re
di
t
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
R
isk
R
eg
io
n
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
Er
ro
r
Z
St
at
ist
ic
P-
va
lu
e
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
01
6*
2.
13
0.
01
0
0.
99
2
So
ut
h
-0
.0
06
**
0.
00
3
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
01
6*
2.
13
0.
00
4
0.
99
7
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
01
6*
2.
13
0.
00
3
0.
99
8
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
01
0.
01
2
So
ut
he
as
t
0.
01
6*
2.
13
0.
00
6
0.
99
6
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
So
ut
h
-0
.0
06
0.
00
3
-2
.0
87
0.
03
7
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
So
ut
h
-0
.0
06
**
0.
00
3
-1
.2
94
0.
19
6
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
01
0.
01
2
So
ut
h
-0
.0
06
**
0.
00
3
-1
.7
15
0.
08
6
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
-0
.1
49
0.
88
1
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
01
0.
01
2
C
en
te
r-
W
es
t
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
0.
51
2
0.
60
9
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
A
m
az
on
In
te
rio
r
0.
01
0.
01
2
0.
46
2
0.
64
4
C
oa
st
al
N
or
th
ea
st
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
57
bean acreage, an 18.5% increase in soy acreage, a 9.1% increase in sugar acreage
and an 8.2% increase in rice acreage.. Soybeans are statistically more responsive
to increases in credit than sugarcane and rice. When looking at availability risk,
soybeans see a statistically different response in comparison to beans, sugar and rice.
Soybeans see increases in acreage as risk increases, while beans, sugar and rice see
decreases.
In the Amazon Interior coffee is more responsive than beans and sugar to increases
in rural credit availability. A 10% increase in credit is associated with an 8.1% increase
in coffee acreage, a 3.9% increase in bean acreage and a 3.7% increase in sugarcane
acreage. Sugarcane response to credit risk is statistically different to that of rice,
coffee, and beans. Sugarcane acreage increases with increases in availability risk,
where as rice, coffee and bean acreage decreases.
The central northeastern region of Brazil Is characterized by sugarcane acreage
that increases as rural credit availability risk increases on average, which is statisti-
cally different from that of rice and coffee acreage which both decrease.
6.3. Effects of Rural Credit on Total Crop Acreage
It may be more cost effective and simplistic to implement a policy that does not
target any particular crop. In this likely scenario, understanding how rural credit
affects total crop acreage may be more relevant. A series of regressions are run to
examine the effects of rural credit and rural credit risk on total crop acreage across
regions, the results of which are presented in Table 13.
In all regions acreage is positively correlated with increases in rural credit, however
this coefficient is not statistically significant in the Amazon Border. A series of
statistical tests indicate that there is no statistical difference between any of the
coefficients across regions. Rural credit risk appears to play more limited role in crop
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Table 13: Effects of Rural Credit on Total Acreage - OLS
Variable Southeast South CenterWest
Amazon
Interior
Coastal
Northeast
Amazon
Border
Lagged Acreage 0.936*** 0.974*** 0.960*** 0.897*** 0.775*** 0.931***
(130.20) (241.33) (164.81) (60.23) (66.61) (111.53)
Bean Price 0.038 -0.273*** -0.242 0.349*** -1.829*** 0.000
(1.50) (-3.13) (-1.35) (3.56) (-9.62) (.)
Coffee Price -0.023 0.336*** -0.666 -0.181 0.705*** 0.000
(-0.23) (5.90) (-1.13) (-0.26) (3.88) (.)
Rice Price 0.166 -0.125*** -0.099 0.151 -2.964*** 0.000
(1.08) (-2.68) (-0.25) (0.24) (-10.04) (.)
Soy price -0.051 -0.192*** 0.828** -0.141 -0.088 -0.009*
(-1.38) (-8.96) (2.44) (-1.46) (-1.09) (-2.17)
Sugar price 0.025 -0.372*** -0.095 0.122 -0.916*** 0.000
(0.20) (-5.51) (-0.45) (0.14) (-6.34) (.)
Wheat Price -0.201 0.121** -0.150 -0.276 -1.455*** 0.000
(-1.09) (2.56) (-0.91) (-0.67) (-13.63) (.)
Credit 0.016*** 0.008* 0.015*** 0.003* 0.019*** 0.004
Availability (3.19) (1.93) (3.27) (1.86) (2.82) (1.19)
Credit 0.001 0.000 -0.003*** 0.001* 0.009*** 0.001
Risk (1.11) (0.78) (-3.24) (2.16) (7.08) (1.51)
N 15828 11278 4381 2967 9069 4500
R2 0.922 0.976 0.956 0.913 0.720 0.941
All variables are logged so coefficients are elasticities. In all regressions lagged crop
acreage, year-fixed effects, municipality characteristics, and state trends are included.
*, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level
respectively
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acreage determination as seen by insignificant results in the Southeast, South and
Amazon Border. As rural credit risk increases, crop acreage decreases in the Center-
West and is statistically significant. However in the Amazon Interior and the Coastal
Northeast, crop acreage increases with increases in credit risk. It is also important to
note, that even with differences in direction and magnitudes across regions, there is
no statistical difference between the rural credit risk coefficient in any of the models
according to z-tests.
7. Limitations
One of the major limitations of this paper deals with price data availability. More
specifically, in the case of spot prices, data is only available at the state-level. Having
more price variation across municipalities may allow for better results in regard to own
price elasticities. Still, in general, own price elasticity estimates remain reasonable.
Additionally, in the case of futures prices, Brazil did not have a formal futures market
throughout the time period of interest, and since this is not the primary area of
focus of this paper, proxies for this — such as international futures prices are not
included — time fixed effects should be able to capture some of this variation. Another
major limitation of the model is that the Brazilian Bank only has rural credit data
available from 1993-2004 severely limiting the time period of analysis. More years of
observation could strengthen the results as well.
8. Conclusions
Even with the aforementioned issues, evidence strongly suggest that rural credit plays
a significant role in the Brazilian agricultural decision making process. Increases in
rural credit availability increases the probability that sugarcane and soybeans will be
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planted in the following time period in all regions of Brazil. Furthermore, farmers
are significantly less likely to plant sugarcane in the Southeast, South, Center-West,
and Coastal Northeast if rural credit availability risk increases. Similarly, farmers are
less likely to plant soybeans in the South in the presence of high fluctuations of rural
credit.
When looking specifically at the effects of credit on sugarcane crop acreage deter-
mination across regions, it can be seen that the effects vary across regions Sugarcane
acreage is more responsive in the South to increases in rural credit availability in
comparison to the Southeast, Amazon Interior, and Coastal Northeast. The South
sees a 12.9% increase in sugarcane acreage for every 10% increase in rural credit,
the Southeast a 6.8% increase, the Amazon Interior a 3.7% increase and the Coastal
Northeast a 3.1% increase. Similarly, response to rural credit availability risk is
statistically different in the Amazon Interior from that observed in the Southeast,
South, Center-West, and Coastal Northeast. In the Amazon Interior, municipalities
are characterized by risk seeking behavior, whereas the other municipalities appear
to be more risk averse.
Crop elasticities within regions but across crops show that there are also differences
in the responsiveness of acreage to rural credit effects and availability expectations. In
the southeast, for instance, coffee acreage is statistically more responsive to increases
in rural credit availability than beans, sugar, rice and wheat. In contrast coffee in
the Center-West is statistically less responsive to increases in rural credit than beans,
soy, sugar, and rice.
When looking at crop acreage in aggregate, increases in rural credit is associated
with increases in crop acreage ranging from 0.03% to 1.9% per 10% increase in credit
availability. There are no statistical differences when comparing these coefficients
across regions, however. Rural credit risk appears to play a more limited role in total
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crop acreage determination. Looking at specific crops suggests that it is important to
analyze the potential effects of subsidized credit on land-use change due to potential
environmental consequences.
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Chapter 3: The Distributional Effects of an Environmental
Tax in Brazil
1. Introduction
Environmental governance is a concept in environmental policy that seeks to maintain
resource availability, now and in the future, while balancing the social and economic
consequences of conservation (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Delmas and Young, 2009;
Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; Brandes and Brooks, 2005). As Brazil emerges from
the developing into the developed world, the increase in demand for natural resources
and manufactured goods continues to take its toll on the environment (Tolmasquim
and Machado, 2003; Uhl et al., 1997). When Former Environment Minister Marina
Silva resigned from her office in 2008, she indicated frustration over the Brazilian
government’s prioritization of the economy and big businesses over environmental
sustainability (Colitt, 2008). Despite these claims, Brazil has been praised in the
global community as it continues to meet sustainability and environmental objectives
including lower deforestation rates and reduced carbon emissions (Nepstad et al.,
2009; Fearnside, 2005).
One such way of extending environmental governance is understanding how the
burden of an environmental tax is allocated among consumers through product prices,
workers through wage rates, and other factors of production through rates of returns
(Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002). Like many countries, Brazil has set environmental
standards based on knowledge that there are substantial short-run and long-run mone-
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tary, health, and food security benefits (West et al., 2006; Hall et al., 1992; Rosenzweig
et al., 1998). Past research has examined the distributional effects of environmental
taxes primarily in developed countries. This study will add to the existing literature
by examining the effects of environmental regulations on the Brazilian economy. The
model further adds to the existing literature by taking into account the effects of
an environmental policy on food security. Maintaining food security is an important
issue in Brazil and other developing countries.
2. Conceptual Framework
Environmental taxes are usually placed on activities, commodities, and pollutants
that are harmful to the environment. The aim of such a tax is to create economic
incentives that reduce environmental harm. An environmental tax generally leads
to an increase in the relative price of commodities. The magnitude of the impact
such policies have on consumers depends on their allocation of income. The cost of
the tax may fall disproportionately on certain individuals if a high fraction of their
income is allocated to goods that see sizable price increases following a policy change.
Such a scenario is particularly relevant for food security analyses, particularly in a
transitioning or developing country such as Brazil, since lower income and higher
commodity prices may lead to lower food consumption.
The effects of an environmental tax on factors of production is arguably indeter-
minate. In the case of labor, for instance, an environmental tax can be viewed as
an increase in the rental rate of productive capital which leads to lower output (out-
put effect) and a shift away from capital (substitution effect). Output effect refers
to the change in quantity demanded of an input resulting from an increase in the
input’s price.The substitution effect is the decrease in the quantity demanded of an
input that results from the firm’s substituting away from that factor when its price
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increases (Parry, 1995). When the price of one factor rises relative to that of another,
firms substitute away from the factor whose price has risen to the factor whose rela-
tive price has fallen. As a result the net effect on labor demand depends on whether
the output effect is larger than the substitution effect (Deschenes, 2014). Similarly,
a tax may incentivize firms to invest in new technologies leading to an increase in
capital. If the demand for capital relative to labor increases, this could result in lower
wages and lower income for households (Metcalf, 1999; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002).
3. Literature Review
3.1. Empirical Analyses
The Clean Air Act of 1963 was implemented in the United States to reduce green-
house gas emissions nationwide. This policy is the focus of most empirical evaluations
examining the effects of environmental regulations on the labor market. In 1970 and
1977, amendments to the Clean Air Act were to enforce pollution standards under
the guidance of Environmental Protection Agency (Belden, 2001; Deschenes, 2014).
In the late 1970s California implemented more stringent standards than those en-
forced at the federal level, allowing for measurable differences in regulatory intensities
(Deschenes, 2014; Berman and Bui, 2001). Using plant-level data from 1979-1991,
Berman and Bui (2001) are able to compare the impact of nitrogen oxide regulations
on employment, pollution-control investments, and value added by matching manu-
facturing plants in Los-Angeles to comparable plants in other parts of the country
unaffected by additional environmental standards. Ultimately they find additional
regulations resulted in large capital investments to reduce emissions with no change
in the demand for labor.
Using 1.75 million observations from the Census of Manufactures from 1972–1987,
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Greenstone (2001) uses the 1970 and 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act to
see how enforcement of the regulations impacted employment on counties that were
unable to attain the reduction goals. The study concluded that during the first
15 years of implementation, the Clean Air Act resulted in a loss of 590,000 jobs
(approximately 3.4% of employment in the manufacturing sector during the study
period), $37 billion in capital stock, and $75 billion in output in the non-attainment
counties.
A study by Walker (2012) takes into account the distributional effects of regulatory
changes. His study is also the first to look at the effects of environmental regulations
on earnings. The study focuses on nationwide plant-level variation induced by the
Clean Air Act Reforms of the 1990s. He is able to account for transitional costs
associated with reallocating production and workers. He notes that there may be
no net cost on the labor market if workers are able to maintain earnings by finding
employment elsewhere. He finds that workers in newly regulated plants experienced
an aggregate $5.4 billion in foregone earnings in the years following the policy. Fur-
thermore, workers who were able to remain at their original place of employment did
not see a loss in income. Workers who re-entered the job market lost approximately
20% of their income, on average.
Martin et al. (2011) provide the first empirical investigation on a labor market
other than the United States. Their study estimates the impact of a carbon tax on UK
manufacturing plants. Using Production Census panel data, they are able to exploit
exogenous variation in eligibility for a tax discount by comparing the outcomes of
plants subject to the full tax and plants that paid only 20% of the tax. They conclude
that the carbon tax had no significant impact on employment, revenue, or plant exit.
A handful of empirical works look at the distributional effects of environmental
taxes. Poterba (1991) uses data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to assess the
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consequences of US gasoline taxes by calculating the share of expenditures households
devote to gasoline purchases. He concludes that gasoline taxes are not regressive, but
instead the burden falls primarily on the middle class, he attributes this to the fact
that the poor rely mostly on public rather than private modes of transportation.
When observing the consequences of various emission taxes within the US, Walls and
Hanson (1999) find that these policies appear to be regressive when using annual
income measures, but after constructing a lifetime income the tax burden no longer
falls heaviest on the poor.
3.2. Equilibrium Models
Changes in policies and regulations can have unexpected and complex economic ef-
fects. A regulation implemented in one sector can impact another sector simply
because one sector’s demand is another sector’s supply. Computable General Equi-
librium (CGE) models are well suited for incorporating such spillover effects, which
are hard to accurately portray in a regression model.
Berck and Hoffmann (2002), use a CGE model to understand labor market effects.
In one analysis, they employ a 30% tax on the energy, minerals, fishing and forestry
sectors of California. They find these industries see roughly 3,400 fewer workers, 1,600
of which are able to find jobs in other sectors of the economy, leading to only 1,800
workers lost in the entire state. In the same paper, Berck and Hoffmann also consider
California’s implementation of the Clean Air Act using a CGE model. They find that
the policy results in a $461 million (0.035%) decline in statewide output. Income
drops by about $511 million across the state (0.057%). Approximately 0.012% or
2,822 families move out of the state and 3,822 (0.027% of) jobs are lost.
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) use a CGE model to understand the effect a pollution
tax may have on the wage rate for labor and the return to capital. Two sectors are
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modeled, a “clean” sector that uses capital and labor as factors of production, and a
“dirty” sector that uses capital, labor and pollution. Their main conclusions are that
the “substitution effect” places less burden on the factor that is a better substitute
for pollution. Additionally, the “output effect” places more burden on the factor that
is most intensively used in the dirty sector.
In the development setting, Timilsina and Shrestha (2002) look at the effects of a
carbon tax ranging from US$10/tC to US$40/tC in Thailand. They use two different
methods to recycle tax revenue back into the economy. In the first case, tax revenue
is returned to households as a lump-sum transfer. In the second case, tax revenue is
used to fund income tax rate cuts. They find that using tax revenue to fund income
tax cuts results in less welfare loss in comparison to household lump-sum transfers.
The reductions in CO2, SO2, and NO2 emissions are similar in both cases and, thus,
not heavily influenced by the tax scheme.
Xie and Saltzman (2000) assess several environmental policies using a five-year
dynamic CGE model of China. The policies they examine include emission taxes
on waste water and subsidizing waste water treatment activities. According to their
findings, an emissions tax results in lower waste water production, a loss of GDP,
and an increase in unemployment. Furthermore, most production sectors see lower
production output. When the waste water treatments are subsidized, waste water
production does not see a substantial decrease, and the producers that bear the
biggest cost were not the heavy polluters prior to the policy change.
This paper adds to the extant literature by observing widespread effects of an
environmental tax in Brazil. Particular attention is given to aspects concerning food
security as well as measurements of societal welfare. To the author’s knowledge,
food security is not highlighted in previous studies. While welfare effects have been
evaluated, it has not been done in the Brazilian case.
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3.3. Structure of CGE Models
A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) is composed of a series of equations that
represent an economy and is a tool often used for quantitative ex-ante evaluation
of policy change. CGEs comply to the Arrow-Debreu theory of general equilibrium
which suggests that under the economic assumptions of convex preferences, perfect
competition, and demand independence, there exists a set of prices such that the
quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded for all commodities within an econ-
omy (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). The equations within these models are calibrated
to economic data and solved for the set of supplies, demands, and prices that sup-
port equilibrium across sectors within an economy (Wing, 2004; Lofgren et al., 2002;
Peterson, 2003).
Economies represented by CGE models typically have the same basic structure.
There are a set of producers, households, and governments whose activities are linked
by markets for commodities, activities, and factors (Wing, 2004; Lofgren et al., 2002).
The equations of a CGE model capture the circular flow of money within an econ-
omy as seen in Figure 7. Households obtain income from factors of production and
other institutions. Income from households is used for transfers to other institutions,
consumption of goods, and taxes. Households can save and invest their income. The
government collects taxes and transfers from other institutions for consumption of
goods and transfers to other institutions. The government can also save their in-
come. Foreign exports and imports are represented by the flows to and from the rest
of the world.
Data on the actual values and flow of money are organized and can be obtained
from a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) which is a representation of the flow of pay-
ments between actors in the economy. Table 14 shows a basic SAM wherein each cell
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Households Governments Saving/Inv.Producers
Factor Markets
Product Markets
Rest of the World
Foreign Savings
Income Taxes
Government
savings
Demand for Final Goods
Private
consumption
Transfers
Domestic
Sales
Exports
Domestic Private Saving
Factor
Costs
Demand for
Intermediate
Inputs
Investment
Demand
Government
Consumption
Wages &
Rents
Imports
Figure 7: Economic Flow of the Economy
Source: Lofgren et al. (2002)
represents a payment from a column account to a row. Activities pay for intermediate
inputs, factors of production, and producer taxes to the government. They receive
payments from domestic sales and exports. Commodity accounts buy goods from
producers (activities) and the rest of the world (imports) and sells them to be used
as intermediate inputs for other activities, household consumption, government con-
sumption, and investment accounts (Wing, 2004; Lofgren et al., 2002). For simplicity,
indirect taxes are not incorporated into this simple SAM.
Elasticities capture behavioral responses and are another important component
of CGE models. They are used to calibrate the model, along with information from
the SAM. Elasticities are usually obtained from empirical analyses on the country of
interest, or a country with similar characteristics (Annabi et al., 2008).
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3.4. Strengths and Limitations of CGE Models
The primary advantage of a CGE model is that it can predict the widespread impact of
a policy change. CGE models explicitly contain the production and demand functions
for all agents in an economy. These models also incorporate feedback mechanisms
allowing them to account for the interdependence of all sectors in the economy as well
as the rest of the world. Thus, distrubitive and spillover effects of a policy change can
be captured by these models. CGE models, however, have several caveats. Firstly,
the complexity of CGE models requires collecting substantial high quality data, which
can be quite difficult to obtain in the development setting (Roberts, 1994). This data
aids in building Social Accounting Matrices, and helps with the calculation of vari-
ous elasticities. Because of their complexity, analysis of CGE models are limited to
magnitudes, directions, and distributive patterns rather than the numeric outcomes
themselves (IDB, 2015). They should be used as “road maps” for policy implementa-
tion, which are advised to be complemented by additional analytical work . Another
limitation of CGE models is that while the input-output matrix of a CGE uses real
data, the conclusions from a CGE are largely driven by prices, income elasticities,
and closure rules . Sensitivity analyses can be utilized to determine which parameters
may substantially influence the equilibrium if their change is small. This approach
has been used in other CGE models (Domingues and Haddad, 2005).
Input-Output models (I-O) and Partial Equilibrium (PE) models are also used
to model policy change. I-O models are considered a limiting case of a CGE. The
database for I-O models is an in I-O matrix that shows the economic flow of factors of
production (labor, capital, land) and other inputs in the production of a specific good.
I-O models solve a system of equations to determine the demand for inputs necessary
to produce manufactured goods within an economy. The solution to this system
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provides multipliers that can be used to estimate the economy-wide effects that a
policy change has on a regional economy. I-O models have no supply-side constraints
on factors of production such as labor and capital, they also assume prices are fixed.
Thus a tax that affects the price of commodities cannot be directly assessed with the
model (Charney and Vest, 2003). CGE models are able to capture price changes,
which is especially relevant when analyzing food security and the effects of prices on
consumer demand.
Like CGE models, PE models also solve for the set of prices, quantities demanded,
and quantities supplied of various goods within an economy. Howeve,r PE models
only partially model an economy. They do not incorporate the rest of the world,
and only analyze the effects of a policy change on a few sectors (World Bank, 2010).
A partial equilibrium model is ideal when a policy change will have no or limited
spillover effects. CGE models are able to capture a much wider set of impacts.
4. Model, Structure and Database
Ideally a panel of firm-level data containing individual characteristics across time and
space, along with the ability to assign treatment and control groups would be utilized
to ascertain the effects of regulations on the labor market (Deschenes, 2014). In the
absence of such data and a specific policy, a CGE model will be used to simulate
policy change. While there are the aforementioned drawbacks to this approach, CGE
models are advantageous in that they are able to account for possible spillovers from
other sectors, and they can simulate multiple ex-ante scenarios.
The model in this analysis is a short run one-time period model adapted to the
state of the Brazilian economy in the 1995–1996 time period. The model is run
using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). The base code for the model
comes from IFPRI’s Standard CGE Model, which provides a neoclassical-structuralist
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framework (Lofgren et al., 2002). IFPRI also provides a SAM for Brazil during the
specified time period of 1995–1996 (Cattaneo, 2002). The Standard CGE Model
includes several key features that make it ideal for the development setting including
household consumption of non-marketed goods and transaction costs for commodities
that enter the market. The model is flexible allowing for multiple closure rules and
functional forms for demand and supply equations
4.1. Production, Activities, and Factor Markets
The sectors represented in the model are detailed in Table 15. On the production side
there are 15 production sectors (activities) and 24 commodities. Producers maximize
profit subject to a production technology illustrated in Figure 8, Activities produce
commodities according to fixed yield coefficients; constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) functions specify the technology for quantities of value-added inputs; and
Leontief functions1 specify intermediate inputs (Lofgren et al., 2002).
4.2. Institutions
As illustrated in figure 8, households, enterprises, the government, and the rest of
the world make up institutions. Households are disaggregated into five categories
based on a combination of income and urban or rural locality. It is assumed that
income elasticities of demand vary by commodity, so a Linear Expenditure System
(LES) is used. This implies households maximize utility by choosing consumption c
1For more information regarding the particular benefits of certain functional forms in CGE
models, refer to Pauw (2003)
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Table 15: Sectors Represented in Social Accounting Matrix
Sector Components
Production
smallholder annuals, large farm annuals, smallholder
perennials, large farm perennials, smallholder livestock, large
farm livestock, smallholder other agric products, large farm
other agric products, forest Products, food processing,
mining and oil, industry, construction, trade and
transportation, services
Commodity
Markets
coffee, cocoa , corn, rice, beans, manioc, other perennials,
other annuals , sugar cane, soy , horticultural products,
milk, livestock, poultry, extractivist forest products, logging
, deforestation , other agricultural products, processed food ,
mining and oil , industrial products, construction, trade and
transportation, services
Factors of
Production
urban skilled & unskilled food processing labor, urban
skilled & unskilled heavy industry labor, urban skilled &
unskilled light industry labor, urban skilled & unskilled
construction labor, urban skilled services labor, urban
unskilled services labor, rural skilled labor, rural unskilled
labor, small farm agricultural capital , large farm
agricultural capital , non-agricultural capital , arable land,
grassland, forested land
Households urban poor household, urban middle, rural poor , ruralmedium, high income household
Other enterprises, direct taxes, indirect taxes, tariffs, government,rest of world, savings-investment, stock changes
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Commodity outputs
(fixed yield coefficients)
Activity Level
(Leontief Function)
Value Added
(CES Function)
Intermediate
(Leontief function)
Composite
Commodities
Imported Domestic
Primary factors
Figure 8: Production Technology
Source: Lofgren et al. (2002)
for commodity i for the following Stone-Geary utility function2:
Maximize
ci
U =∏(ci − γi)αi
subject to ∑
i
pici = R, ∑
i
αi = 1
(26)
Where γi denotes some minimum value of consumption, pi represents price, R is
income, and αi is a share parameter. The solution to this optimization problem is
represented by optimal consumption denoted by the demand functionb in equation
(2):
c∗i = γi +
αi
pi
[R−∑
j
pjγj] (27)
2The explanation regarding household utility functions is adapted from Annabi et al. (2008)
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The parameters γi and αi can be calibrated using information from income and
price elasticities. Information on income, R, can be extracted from the SAM (Annabi
et al., 2008). The income elasticities and price elasticities are represented by the
following equations εri = αiRpici and εpi =
(1−αi)γi)
ci
− 1 respectively. These elasticities
are made available by Cattaneo (2002) and Kinnunen et al. (2012).
4.3. Commodity Markets
It is assumed that there is imperfect substitutability between foreign and domestic
goods. This implies that domestic demand for a commodity is a Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) production function. Thus producers maximize profit subject
to the following Armington constraint3:
Maximize
Di,Mi
PQiQi = PDiDi + PMiMi
subject to Qi = Ai[αiM
−ρ
i + (1− αi)D−ρi ]
1
ρ
(28)
Where the total quantity of a good is denoted by Qi , local production of the
good is represented by Di , Mi is production imported from a foreign origin, P
represents prices, and Ai is a scale parameter. The calibration of ρ is easily obtained
by considering the elasticity of substitution, εs = 11+ρ . At equilibrium the relative
quantity of imports versus local goods can be denoted by the following equation:
M∗i
D∗i
= [
PDi
PMi
αi
1+ αi
]εs (29)
Similarly, supply is represented by a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET)
function. This means there is no perfect substitutability between the supply of local
goods that are exported to another region and the goods supplied within the other re-
3The following explanation regarding production functions is adapted from (Annabi et al., 2008)
77
gion Pauw (2003). Elasticities used to calibrate CES and CET functions are provided
by Menezes et al. (2008) and De Souza Pedroso et al. (2003).
4.4. Macroeconomic Balances
The closure system of the model is a savings driven “neoclassical closure”, where
for the government balance, it is assumed that tax rates are fixed and government
spending is variable. For the external balance, it is assumed that foreign savings are
fixed and the exchange rate is variable. Finally for the saving investment balance,
it is assumed that the economy is savings driven, non-government savings rates are
fixed, while the quantity of each commodity in the investment bundle is multiplied
by a flexible scale so that investment cost is equals savings.
4.5. Scenarios
Similar to the methodology presented by Berck and Hoffmann (2002) and Metcalf
(1999), the effects of environmental regulations will be considered by placing an ad-
valorem tax on four activities. An ad-valorem tax is based on the value of a transac-
tion. Sales tax and value-added tax are well known examples. In theory, a pigovian
tax would be placed on the negative externalities to correct the inefficient market
outcome caused by over pollution (Fullerton, 1996; Bluffstone, 2003). Pigovian taxes
would be set so that the social benefits associated with the tax equal the social costs
of the pollution. Implementation of a pigovian tax requires prefect information in
regards to consumer’s valuation of the environment and the polluting activities of
firms. in reality, this is often difficult to implement, even for developed countries,
because valuation studies can be quite costly, and producers have little incentive to
accurately disclose their polluting practices (Bluffstone, 2003).
Emissions tax is considered a “second-best” taxation scheme, and is employed
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in many developed countries. Such a policy does not require knowing the marginal
benefits associated with a policy change, and because all economic agents face the
same tax rate, firms have the incentive to be environmentally efficient (Fullerton,
1996; Bluffstone, 2003). Emissions taxes require a reasonable estimate of the marginal
costs associated with pollution abatement in order to understand how firms may act
following a policy change. Developing countries often have public administration
deficiencies and are more likely to have many small firms, both of which could make
monitoring and enforcing a second-best tax infeasible (Bluffstone, 2003).
In the “third best” scenario a tax is placed on products or inputs, and is not based
on actual environmental performance. This would include ad-valorem taxes issued on
activities that harm the environment and taxes issued on dirty inputs. Theoretically,
these taxes are imprecise and not as efficient as first or second-best taxes, but third-
best taxes may be first best when the costs of implementing and enforcing another
tax scheme is sufficiently high, as is the case with many developing and transitioning
economies (Bluffstone, 2003).
As in the study by Fullerton and Heutel (2007), this model assumes that the
supply of labor and capital are fixed and implements “third-best” environmental tax
is. Multiple tax scenarios are considered. An additional tax from the base time
period ranging from 1% to 20% is levied on the following sectors: the mining and oil,
industry, construction, and transportation as highlighted in Table 16. In the initial
time period, approximately $35 billion dollars of tax is generated within these sectors.
Equilibrium equations are modified to account for the additional tax. In lieu of a
tax, 0 < τi < 1, the new producer maximization problem becomes:
Maximize
Di,Mi
PQiQi = (1− τi)PDiDi + PMiMi
subject to Qi = Ai[αiM
−ρ
i + (1− αi)D−ρi ]
1
ρ
(30)
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Table 16: Tax Scenarios
Base Tax Base Tax Scenario
Activity Payment Rate 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Mining and Oil 2.802 0.071 0.081 0.121 0.171 0.221 0.271
Industry 27.057 0.061 0.071 0.111 0.161 0.211 0.261
Construction 5.158 0.062 0.072 0.112 0.162 0.212 0.262
Transportation 8.505 0.088 0.098 0.138 0.188 0.238 0.288
The new equilibrium equation becomes:
M∗i
D∗i
= [
(1− τi)PDi
PMi
αi
1+ αi
]εs (31)
In this CGE model, the government is treated as a “passive entity”, collecting
taxes and immediately transferring lump-sum payments to households (Wing, 2004).
This way the government does not need to be explicitly modeled within the CGE.
Thus, the tax is treated as a transfer of purchasing power.
5. Results
Previous studies on environmental tax incidence typically examine the effects over
several years. While labor mobility and unemployment assumptions are necessary in
long run analyses, due to the use of only one time period, labor is assumed to be fixed
and immobile while wages vary.
Under the assumption that decreasing output decreases pollution, Table 17 indi-
cates that the implementation of the tax results in the intended outcome: the supply
of goods by taxed producers decreases except in the construction sector which re-
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mains unchanged. Of importance, there appears to be no environmentally detrimental
spillovers into the forestry sector as seen by a decrease in logging and deforestation.
Other notable changes in commodity supply highlighted in Table 17 include decreases
in the supply of corn, sugarcane, beans, manioc, and processed foods. On the other
hand coffee, rice and livestock supplies increase. This may be particularly relevant
when considering the impact of agricultural inputs and runoff on the environment.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) refers to the monetary value of all goods and
services produced in an economy. GDP is equal to the sum of private consumption
(consumer spending), fixed investment (business spending), government consumption,
net exports (exports minus imports). Table 18 shows that in all scenarios GDP
increases. After a 1% tax, for instance, GDP increases by 1.3%. A 5% tax results
in a 6.7% GDP increase . In all cases, the increase in GDP can be attributed to an
increase in land, buildings, vehicles, and other fixed investments. Consumer spending,
government spending, imports and exports all contribute to lower GDP.
While GDP provides a holistic measure of the economy, it has been argued that
it ignores key aspects of the economy which can make it a misleading measure of
economic growth and welfare (Fleurbaey, 2009; Messinger and Tarasofsky, 1997;
Costanza et al., 2009). An increase in GDP is not necessarily ideal if there is ex-
ploitation of land, capital, or labor. GDP does not take into consideration the welfare
effects associated with changes in prices, wages or utility.
5.1. The Effects on Factors of Production
Table 19 highlights the percentage change in wages from the baseline under the fixed
labor assumption. Implementation of the policy shows fairly sizable changes in wages
for those within the labor market. Interestingly, construction workers benefit from
such a policy change seeing a 23% increase in wage after a 1% tax up to a 5-fold
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Table 17: Percentage Change in Commodity Supply
Commodity Base Scenario
Demanded Supply 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
mining and oil 22.521 -0.007 -0.034 -0.070 -0.107 -0.146
industrial products 438.555 -0.002 -0.008 -0.015 -0.023 -0.031
construction 83.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
trade and transportation 91.162 -0.028 -0.143 -0.298 -0.466 -0.649
logging 4.086 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
deforestation 0.603 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.015
coffee 4.955 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
cocoa 0.198 -0.019 -0.097 -0.200 -0.307 -0.420
corn 6.794 -0.005 -0.025 -0.053 -0.085 -0.122
rice 3.007 -0.002 -0.012 -0.026 -0.042 -0.060
beans 1.928 -0.007 -0.039 -0.084 -0.136 -0.196
manioc 2.202 -0.010 -0.053 -0.113 -0.183 -0.264
other perennials 2.756 -0.015 -0.078 -0.160 -0.246 -0.336
other annuals 4.321 -0.009 -0.047 -0.099 -0.157 -0.221
sugar cane 8.133 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
soy 4.051 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.011
horticultural products 1.872 -0.010 -0.052 -0.111 -0.179 -0.258
milk 8.719 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.016 0.024
livestock 19.106 0.002 0.009 0.018 0.029 0.040
poultry 7.128 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009
extractivist forest products 0.022 -0.014 -0.070 -0.142 -0.218 -0.297
logging 4.086 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
deforestation 0.603 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.015
other agricultural products 4.372 0.017 0.088 0.179 0.274 0.374
processed food 82.541 -0.010 -0.052 -0.108 -0.167 -0.232
mining and oil 22.521 -0.007 -0.034 -0.070 -0.107 -0.146
industrial products 438.555 -0.002 -0.008 -0.015 -0.023 -0.031
construction 83.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
trade and transportation 91.162 -0.028 -0.143 -0.298 -0.466 -0.649
services 419.017 0.024 0.119 0.232 0.340 0.441
82
Table 18: GDP Measures
GDP Base Scenario
Component Value 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
private consumption 429.753 -0.003 -0.017 -0.043 -0.080 -0.126
fixed investment 126.644 6.705 35.614 77.190 126.253 184.882
government consumption 110.483 -0.129 -0.641 -1.276 -1.904 -2.531
exports 46.311 -0.023 -0.098 -0.146 -0.133 -0.043
imports -55.049 0.012 0.074 0.193 0.367 0.609
GDP 658.142 1.263 6.717 14.574 23.867 34.993
increase in wage after a 20% tax increase. While seemingly high, Table 20 indicates
that construction workers see relatively low wages at baseline in comparison to workers
in other industries. Even after the wage increases, workers in the service industries
earn a significantly higher income. The increase in fixed investments, in particular
buildings, may explain why there is an increase in construction wage. All other labor
types are associated with decreases in wages in every scenario, with the heavy and
light industry sectors being most negatively impacted throughout. Light industry
wages decrease by about 3.05% for a 1% increase in tax. Similarly, heavy industry
wages decrease by 2.62% for a 1% tax increase. In comparison, unskilled service
wages decrease from 0.42%; skilled service wage by 0.44%; and food processing wage
by 0.71% after a 1% tax. Skilled and unskilled rural workers also see decreases in
wages, albeit less substantial than those observed in the urban labor force, with wages
decreasing by approximately 0.15% in both sectors in the first scenario.
Changes in factor income are highlighted in Table 21 (change in labor income is
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Table 19: Percentage change in wage by labor type
Labor Scenario
Type 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Food Processing -0.705 -3.699 -7.874 -12.610 -18.015
Heavy Industry -2.623 -13.311 -27.140 -41.546 -56.607
Light Industry -3.046 -15.389 -31.202 -47.488 -64.308
Construction 23.195 117.882 241.062 370.608 507.936
Skilled Service -0.444 -2.288 -4.771 -7.508 -10.574
Unskilled Service -0.426 -2.201 -4.608 -7.275 -10.282
Skilled Ag -0.154 -0.847 -1.902 -3.198 -4.776
Unskilled Ag -0.153 -0.841 -1.889 -3.177 -4.744
not included because it is exactly equal to the percentage change in wage under the
fixed labor assumption). Almost all factors see a fairly uniform decrease in income
after the implementation of the policy change. The only exception is non-agricultural
capital which sees a 0.72% increase in income in the 1% tax scenario up to a 16.27%
increase in income in the 20% tax scenario.
5.2. Food Security
Food security is a major concern after implementation of any policy change in a
developing country. According to Table 22, it appears that prices for most agricultural
commodities increase. Corn and beans for instance see a more than 1% price increase
after an additional 5% environmental tax is implemented. Sugarcane sees a 3.0%
increase in price after a 5% tax. Soy also sees up to a 4.4% price increase at the 20%
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Table 20: Raw Income by Labor Type
Labor Base Scenario
Type Income 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Skilled Food Processing 3.241 3.218 3.121 2.986 2.833 2.657
Unskilled Food Processing 1.958 1.944 1.886 1.804 1.711 1.605
Skilled Heavy Industry 2.769 2.696 2.400 2.017 1.618 1.201
Unskilled Heavy Industry 1.197 1.165 1.037 0.872 0.700 0.519
Skilled Light Industry 41.111 39.859 34.784 28.283 21.588 14.673
Unskilled Light Industry 9.082 8.805 7.684 6.248 4.769 3.241
Skilled Construction 3.488 4.297 7.599 11.895 16.413 21.202
Unskilled Construction 2.858 3.521 6.227 9.747 13.450 17.374
Skilled Service 118.707 118.18 115.991 113.043 109.795 106.155
Unskilled Service 52.002 51.780 50.857 49.606 48.219 46.655
Skilled Ag 2.334 2.330 2.314 2.290 2.259 2.223
Unskilled Ag 15.741 15.717 15.609 15.444 15.241 14.995
85
Table 21: Percentage change in factor income
Factor Base Scenario
Type Income 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Small farm capital 8.792 -0.153 -0.840 -1.883 -3.164 -4.720
Large farm capital 8.225 -0.157 -0.861 -1.932 -3.246 -4.844
Non-ag capital 271.948 0.719 3.676 7.573 11.748 16.272
Arable land 6.130 -0.158 -0.868 -1.948 -3.274 -4.886
Grassland 10.517 -0.150 -0.827 -1.858 -3.125 -4.669
Forested land 1.681 -0.164 -0.892 -1.987 -3.318 -4.924
tax level. Milk is the only agricultural commodity that sees a decrease in prices.
Household income estimations suggest food security may decline for some house-
holds especially since many agricultural commodities are associated with an increase
in price. While Table 23 indicates that low income rural households, middle income
rural households, and high income households see an increase in income, the urban
poor and middle class see decreases in income levels. Lower class urban households
see a 0.03% decrease in income with a 1% tax and the middle class urban households
see a 0.08% decrease in income. A 5% tax results in a 0.19% decrease for the urban
lower class and 0.43% decrease for urban middle class. A 20% tax is associated with
a 0.92% and 1.91% decrease in the lower and middle class urban income respectively.
Additionally, enterprises (businesses) see increases in income from the baseline in
every scenario.
Table 24 further highlights changes in household level food consumption for select
commodities. In the case of corn, rural middle income households see slight increases
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Table 22: Percentage Change in Domestic Agricultural Commodity Prices
Commodity 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Coffee 0.033 0.144 0.237 0.272 0.244
Cocoa 0.138 0.687 1.370 2.051 2.732
Corn 0.244 1.244 2.551 3.933 5.409
Rice 0.251 0.504 0.760 1.018 1.278
Beans 0.154 1.278 2.620 4.039 5.551
Sugarcane 0.583 3.038 6.413 10.185 14.424
Soy 0.208 1.050 2.127 3.237 4.388
Milk -0.035 -0.203 -0.482 -0.846 -1.307
Livestock 0.121 0.596 1.164 1.699 2.199
Processed Food 0.041 0.191 0.346 0.461 0.530
Table 23: Percentage Change in Institutional Income
Household Base Scenario
Type Income 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Urban Low 80.794 -0.037 -0.193 -0.407 -0.646 -0.918
Urban Middle 125.522 -0.084 -0.429 -0.886 -1.376 -1.907
Rural Low 8.149 0.063 0.284 0.481 0.581 0.574
Rural Middle 27.252 0.112 0.541 1.030 1.464 1.843
Upper 277.267 0.041 0.210 0.432 0.673 0.942
Enterprises 277.917 0.687 3.505 7.215 11.180 15.468
87
in consumption, and the rural poor see a slight decrease except when a 1% tax is
implemented. Upper class and urban lower and middle classes all see decreased corn
consumption in all scenarios. The urban poor see up to a 1.7% decrease in corn
consumption after a 20% tax is implemented. The urban middle class see up to a
3.3% decrease in corn consumption at the 20% tax level. Bean consumption is similar
in that rural households exhibit slight increases in consumption in all cases, but the
urban lower and middle class see up to a 1.1% and 2.7% decrease in consumption
respectively. The upper class also exhibits a slight decrease in bean consumption. In
the case of manioc, a staple starch, the urban middle class see the greatest decrease
in consumption in all scenarios ranging from a 0.1% decrease in consumption, after
a tax 1% increase, to a 2.0% decrease in consumption after a 20% increase in tax.
The rural middle see the greatest increase in manioc consumption. Processed food
consumption increases for rural lower and middle income households as well as the
upper class. The urban lower and middle class consume less processed foods in all
scenarios.
5.3. Welfare Effects
Table 25 provides measures of compensating variation or the amount of additional
money an agent would need to reach its initial utility after a change in prices (Chipman
and Moore, 1980). In the case of a negative compensating variation, an individual
is made better off, and therefore needs to give away money to return to their initial
utility. The results indicate that the rural and urban poor, the rural middle class,
and the upper class all experience disutility from the policy. The upper class are
most burdened by the tax followed by the rural middle class, the urban poor, and
finally the rural poor. On the other hand, the urban middle class gain utility and
these households need to give away money to compensate for the fact that they are
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better off than before. The net effect is a net gain in utility within the economy.
Although the fact that the urban middle class is better off seems counter intuitive,
given that they have a decline in income, the income measurements are aggregate mea-
sures. It is possible that the gain in utility from certain members of the urban middle
class, such as construction workers who see large wage increases, is enough to offset
the disutility associated with a loss in income from other members. Construction
workers comprise the urban lower and middle classes.
Table 25: Compensating Variation
Household 1% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Urban Low 0.009 0.040 0.069 0.086 0.087
Urban Middle -0.095 -0.484 -0.997 -1.545 -2.137
Rural Low 0.007 0.032 0.058 0.077 0.088
Rural Middle 0.030 0.145 0.278 0.397 0.503
Upper 0.038 0.197 0.414 0.661 0.951
TOTAL -0.011 -0.070 -0.178 -0.324 -0.508
6. Limitations
One major limitation of the model is the assumption that a tax on sectors that produce
“dirty goods” will lower pollution. While the simple taxation of a dirty sector has
been used in similar analyses (Berck and Hoffmann, 2002) , a more realistic approach
would extend the SAM to account for CO2 emissions. Inclusion of emissions also
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allows for the implementation of an emission abatement policy (Xie, 2000). Lenzen
and Schaeffer (2004) has created such an Environmental SAM for Brazil, for instance,
but it is not readily available. 4.
Another limitation is that the economy is not disaggregated into regions. A re-
gional CGE would provide additional detail in regards to the cost and benefits of
policy implementation. In the case of Brazil, regional disaggregation is often done in
the literature to account for differing biomes that affect agricultural practices (Catta-
neo, 2002; Hausman, 2012). This would most likely have an impact on the distribution
of policy impact as there will most likely be regional differences due to differences in
allocation of resources.
Other notable limitations include assuming labor immobility and fixed employ-
ment, as the effects on employment are also important to understand, however, in
the short run these assumptions are not necessary and the model does not converge.
Additionally, the SAM utilized is somewhat outdated (1995-1996), a more updated
SAM could be computed. Finally, there are the traditional pitfalls of all CGE all mod-
els, namely CGE models can be highly sensitive to functional, closure, and elasticity
assumptions (Lofgren et al., 2002).
7. Conclusions
This paper illustrates the effects of an environmental tax ranging from 1% to 20% on
producers in four polluting sectors in Brazil. A broad view of the economy shows that
the policy is associated with an increase in GDP and a general decrease in output
in sectors that are taxed. Under the assumption of fixed employment and capital,
wages for almost all labor types decrease except for the case of construction workers,
4More information in regards to creating an Environmental SAM can be found in a study by
Xie (2000)
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where the model projects large increase in wages for construction workers. Projections
indicate that workers in the heavy and light industry will see the greatest decrease in
wages.
When looking at the distribution of income and changes in food consumption,
most of the burden of this policy change appears to fall on the urban middle and
urban lower class, as income decreases for these households and consumption of beans,
manioc, corn, and processed foods decrease. On the other hand, the rural poor and
rural middle class see slight increases in income and an increase in manioc, beans and
processed food consumption. Upper class households see increases in income as well.
Compensating variation, a more accurate measure of societal welfare, shows that
the burden of the tax falls primarily on the upper class. The benefits of the tax fall
solely on the urban middle class. The gain in urban middle class utility most likely
stems from the large increase in construction wages which is enough to result in a net
benefit for all households within the economy.
As mentioned previously, CGE models provide a “road map” when it comes to
policy implementation. While a five-fold increase in construction wage may seem
unlikely, the findings indicate that construction workers are likely to be made better
off after the policy change. This is probably due to the increase in fixed-investments
which would include creating and building new infrastructure.
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Appendix A: The Effects of Rural Credit and Land
Constraints on Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
Table 26: Variable Description and Sources
Variable Description Unit Source
Deforestation Annual forest loss Percent INPE
Planted Agriculture land Percent IBGE-SIDRAS
Transport Transportation spending $R 2000 IBGE-SIDRAS
UrbanDens Urban density Population per km2 IPEA
RuralDens Rural density Population per km2 IPEA
NgrUrbanDens Average of neighbors Population per km2 Author
NgrRuralDens Average of neighbors Population per km2 Author
Credit Rural credit stock $R 2000 BCB
HighDens High population densities Dummy Author
C HighD Credit*HighDens $R 2000 Author
LowSoil High area of poor soil Dummy Author
C LowSoil Credit*LowSoil $R 2000 Author
HighCerrado High percentage of cerrado Dummy Author
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 26 – Continued
Variable Description Unit Source
C HighCerrado Credit*HighCerrado $R 2000 Author
Transportlow Low transport spending Dummy Author
C Transportlow Credit*Transportlow $R 2000 Author
Areakm2 Municipality Area Square Kilometers INPE
DistanceFed Distance to Capital Kilometers IPEA
DistanceState Distance to State Capital Kilometers IPEA
Temp Average Temperature Celcius IPEA
Precip Average Precipitation cm IPEA
Nuv Cloud Cover km2 INPE
nao Unobserved area km2 INPE
State1-State9 State Dummys Dummy Author
Year1-Year10 Year Dummys Dummy Author
Soil1-Soil14 Land cover of soil type1-14 Percent IBGE
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Table 27: Net Effects by Resource Constraints Before 20081
Constraint Net Indicator Net Credit
Number2 Effect3 Effect
1 2 3 4 Indicator Effect Credit Effect 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
X 9.859** -1.819** P N
(2.67) (-3.04)
X -7.627** 1.640*** N P
(-2.60) (4.05)
X -6.994* 0.675 N P
(-2.11) (1.60)
X -1.503 -0.294 N N
(-1.53) (-0.90)
X X -15.45*** -3.315** N N N N
(-7.48) (-2.88)
X X -6.550* -5.612** P N N N
(-2.31) (-3.07)
X X 1.256 -0.0209 P N N N
(0.42) (-0.03)
X X -4.736 -12.36*** N N N N
(-1.37) (-3.39)
X X 5.787* -0.378 N P P N
(2.08) (-0.26)
X X -7.671** -1.382 N N N N
(-2.95) (-0.93)
X X X 20.61*** 22.99*** P N P
(3.42) (4.86)
X X X -8.352 4.183 P N P
(-1.41) (0.84)
X X X 5.629 16.81*** P N N N P P
(0.73) (3.74)
X X X 24.89* 15.64** P P P P P P
(2.41) (2.79)
X X X X -16.76 -33.66*** P N P P N N P N
(-1.08) (-3.67)
*,**,*** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
1 Note that significance levels are not taken into account
2 Where Constraint 1-4 denote high population pressures, low quality soil, high areas
of cerrado, and low transportation expenditures respectively.
3 P represents a positive effect and N a negative effect
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Appendix B: Biofuel Crop Acreage Response to Rural Credit
Availability
Table 28: Amazon Border Z-tests of Rural Credit Differences
(a) Rural Credit Availability
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.067 0.015 1.006 0.314
Coffee -0.006 0.071
Bean 0.067 0.015 -3.151 0.002
Soy 0.187 0.035
Bean 0.067 0.015 -0.939 0.348
Rice 0.108 0.041
Coffee -0.006 0.071 -2.438 0.015
Soy 0.187 0.035
Coffee -0.006 0.071 -1.390 0.164
Rice 0.108 0.041
Soy 0.187 0.035 1.465 0.143
Rice 0.108 0.041
(b) Rural Credit Availability Risk
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.003 0.002 0.164 0.869
Coffee 0.001 0.012
Bean 0.003 0.002 0.000 1.000
Soy 0.003 0.005
Bean 0.003 0.002 0.277 0.782
Rice 0.002 0.003
Coffee 0.001 0.012 -0.154 0.878
Soy 0.003 0.005
Coffee 0.001 0.012 -0.081 0.936
Rice 0.002 0.003
Soy 0.003 0.005 0.171 0.864
Rice 0.002 0.003
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Table 29: Center Northeast Z-tests of Rural Credit Differences
(a) Rural Credit Availability
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.091 0.017 0.743 0.457
Coffee 0.058 0.041
Bean 0.091 0.017 1.975 0.048
Sugar 0.028 0.027
Bean 0.091 0.017 2.286 0.022
Rice 0.031 0.02
Coffee 0.058 0.041 0.611 0.541
Sugar 0.028 0.027
Coffee 0.058 0.041 0.592 0.554
Rice 0.031 0.02
Sugar 0.028 0.027 -0.089 0.929
Rice 0.031 0.02
(b) Rural Credit Availability Risk
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.004 0.003 3.148 0.002
Coffee -0.038 0.013
Bean 0.004 0.003 0.000 1.000
Sugar 0.004 0.005
Bean 0.004 0.003 3.601 0.000
Rice -0.017 0.005
Coffee -0.038 0.013 -3.015 0.003
Sugar 0.004 0.005
Coffee -0.038 0.013 -1.508 0.132
Rice -0.017 0.005
Sugar 0.004 0.005 2.970 0.003
Rice -0.017 0.005
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Table 30: Amazon Interior Z-tests of Rural Credit Differences
(a) Rural Credit Availability
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.039 0.01 -2.129 0.033
Coffee 0.081 0.017
Bean 0.039 0.01 -0.657 0.511
Soy 0.105 0.1
Bean 0.039 0.01 0.128 0.898
Sugar 0.037 0.012
Bean 0.039 0.01 -1.114 0.265
Rice 0.086 0.041
Coffee 0.081 0.017 -0.237 0.813
Soy 0.105 0.1
Coffee 0.081 0.017 2.115 0.034
Sugar 0.037 0.012
Coffee 0.081 0.017 -0.113 0.910
Rice 0.086 0.041
Soy 0.105 0.1 0.675 0.500
Sugar 0.037 0.012
Soy 0.105 0.1 0.176 0.860
Rice 0.086 0.041
Sugar 0.037 0.012 -1.147 0.251
Rice 0.086 0.041
(b) Rural Credit Availability Risk
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean -0.01 0.003 1.372 0.170
Coffee -0.018 0.005
Bean -0.01 0.003 -1.617 0.106
Soy 0.01 0.012
Bean -0.01 0.003 -3.771 0.000
Sugar 0.006 0.003
Bean -0.01 0.003 2.458 0.014
Rice -0.031 0.008
Coffee -0.018 0.005 -2.154 0.031
Soy 0.01 0.012
Coffee -0.018 0.005 -4.116 0.000
Sugar 0.006 0.003
Coffee -0.018 0.005 1.378 0.168
Rice -0.031 0.008
Soy 0.01 0.012 0.323 0.746
Sugar 0.006 0.003
Soy 0.01 0.012 2.843 0.004
Rice -0.031 0.008
Sugar 0.006 0.003 4.331 0.000
Rice -0.031 0.008
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Table 31: Center-West Z-tests of Rural Credit Differences
(a) Rural Credit Availability
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.172 0.064 2.470 0.013
Coffee 0.004 0.023
Bean 0.172 0.064 -0.189 0.850
Soy 0.185 0.025
Bean 0.172 0.064 1.125 0.261
Sugar 0.091 0.033
Bean 0.172 0.064 1.217 0.223
Rice 0.082 0.037
Bean 0.172 0.064 2.044 0.041
Wheat -0.013 0.064
Coffee 0.172 0.064 -0.189 0.850
Soy 0.185 0.025
Coffee 0.172 0.064 1.125 0.261
Sugar 0.091 0.033
Coffee 0.172 0.064 1.217 0.223
Rice 0.082 0.037
Coffee 0.172 0.064 2.044 0.041
Wheat -0.013 0.064
Soy 0.185 0.025 2.271 0.023
Sugar 0.091 0.033
Soy 0.185 0.025 2.307 0.021
Rice 0.082 0.037
Soy 0.185 0.025 2.882 0.004
Wheat -0.013 0.064
Sugar 0.091 0.033 0.182 0.856
Rice 0.082 0.037
Sugar 0.091 0.033 1.444 0.149
Wheat -0.013 0.064
Rice 0.082 0.037 1.285 0.199
Wheat -0.013 0.064
(b) Rural Credit Availability Risk
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean -0.02 0.008 -0.703 0.482
Coffee -0.011 0.01
Bean -0.02 0.008 -2.800 0.005
Soy 0.008 0.006
Bean -0.02 0.008 -0.147 0.883
Sugar -0.018 0.011
Bean -0.02 0.008 0.376 0.707
Rice -0.024 0.007
Bean -0.02 0.008 -0.085 0.932
Wheat -0.018 0.022
Coffee -0.011 0.01 -1.629 0.103
Soy 0.008 0.006
Coffee -0.011 0.01 0.471 0.638
Sugar -0.018 0.011
Coffee -0.011 0.01 1.065 0.287
Rice -0.024 0.007
Coffee -0.011 0.01 0.290 0.772
Wheat -0.018 0.022
Soy 0.008 0.006 2.075 0.038
Sugar -0.018 0.011
Soy 0.008 0.006 3.471 0.001
Rice -0.024 0.007
Soy 0.008 0.006 1.140 0.254
Wheat -0.018 0.022
Sugar -0.018 0.011 0.460 0.645
Rice -0.024 0.007
Sugar -0.018 0.011 0.000 1.000
Wheat -0.018 0.022
Rice -0.024 0.007 -0.260 0.795
Wheat -0.018 0.022
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Table 32: Southeast Z-tests of Rural Credit Differences
(a) Rural Credit Availability
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.095 0.022 -2.460 0.014
Coffee 0.203 0.038
Bean 0.095 0.022 0.011 0.991
Soy 0.067 2.5
Bean 0.095 0.022 1.014 0.311
Sugar 0.068 0.015
Bean 0.095 0.022 0.505 0.614
Rice 0.083 0.009
Bean 0.095 0.022 1.351 0.177
Wheat 0.015 0.055
Coffee 0.203 0.038 0.054 0.957
Soy 0.067 2.5
Coffee 0.203 0.038 3.304 0.001
Sugar 0.068 0.015
Coffee 0.203 0.038 3.073 0.002
Rice 0.083 0.009
Coffee 0.203 0.038 2.812 0.005
Wheat 0.015 0.055
Soy 0.067 2.5 0.000 1.000
Sugar 0.068 0.015
Soy 0.067 2.5 -0.006 0.995
Rice 0.083 0.009
Soy 0.067 2.5 0.021 0.983
Wheat 0.015 0.055
Sugar 0.068 0.015 -0.857 0.391
Rice 0.083 0.009
Sugar 0.068 0.015 0.930 0.353
Wheat 0.015 0.055
Rice 0.083 0.009 1.220 0.222
Wheat 0.015 0.055
(b) Rural Credit Availability Risk
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean -0.005 0.002 5.385 0.000
Coffee -0.034 0.005
Bean -0.005 0.002 0.277 0.782
Soy -0.006 0.003
Bean -0.005 0.002 2.219 0.027
Sugar -0.013 0.003
Bean -0.005 0.002 2.496 0.013
Rice -0.014 0.003
Bean -0.005 0.002 -0.986 0.324
Wheat 0.007 0.012
Coffee -0.034 0.005 -4.802 0.000
Soy -0.006 0.003
Coffee -0.034 0.005 -3.601 0.000
Sugar -0.013 0.003
Coffee -0.034 0.005 -3.430 0.001
Rice -0.014 0.003
Coffee -0.034 0.005 -3.154 0.002
Wheat 0.007 0.012
Soy -0.006 0.003 1.650 0.099
Sugar -0.013 0.003
Soy -0.006 0.003 1.886 0.059
Rice -0.014 0.003
Soy -0.006 0.003 -1.051 0.293
Wheat 0.007 0.012
Sugar -0.013 0.003 0.236 0.814
Rice -0.014 0.003
Sugar -0.013 0.003 -1.617 0.106
Wheat 0.007 0.012
Rice -0.014 0.003 -1.698 0.090
Wheat 0.007 0.012
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Table 33: South Z-tests of Rural Credit Differences
(a) Rural Credit Availability
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean 0.146 0.024 0.999 0.318
Coffee 0.073 0.069
Bean 0.146 0.024 0.833 0.405
Soy 0.121 0.018
Bean 0.146 0.024 0.544 0.586
Sugar 0.129 0.02
Bean 0.146 0.024 -0.584 0.559
Rice 0.168 0.029
Bean 0.146 0.024 5.227 0.000
Wheat 0.008 0.011
Coffee 0.073 0.069 -0.673 0.501
Soy 0.121 0.018
Coffee 0.073 0.069 -0.780 0.436
Sugar 0.129 0.02
Coffee 0.073 0.069 -1.269 0.204
Rice 0.168 0.029
Coffee 0.073 0.069 0.930 0.352
Wheat 0.008 0.011
Soy 0.121 0.018 -0.297 0.766
Sugar 0.129 0.02
Soy 0.121 0.018 -1.377 0.169
Rice 0.168 0.029
Soy 0.121 0.018 5.357 0.000
Wheat 0.008 0.011
Sugar 0.129 0.02 -1.107 0.268
Rice 0.168 0.029
Sugar 0.129 0.02 5.301 0.000
Wheat 0.008 0.011
Rice 0.168 0.029 5.159 0.000
Wheat 0.008 0.011
(b) Rural Credit Availability Risk
Crop Coeff SE Z-stat P-val
Bean -0.044 0.006 1.580 0.114
Coffee -0.077 0.02
Bean -0.044 0.006 -5.665 0.000
Soy -0.006 0.003
Bean -0.044 0.006 -3.467 0.001
Sugar -0.019 0.004
Bean -0.044 0.006 0.354 0.724
Rice -0.047 0.006
Bean -0.044 0.006 -6.483 0.000
Wheat -0.003 0.002
Coffee -0.077 0.02 -3.511 0.000
Soy -0.006 0.003
Coffee -0.077 0.02 -2.844 0.004
Sugar -0.019 0.004
Coffee -0.077 0.02 -1.437 0.151
Rice -0.047 0.006
Coffee -0.077 0.02 -3.682 0.000
Wheat -0.003 0.002
Soy -0.006 0.003 2.600 0.009
Sugar -0.019 0.004
Soy -0.006 0.003 6.112 0.000
Rice -0.047 0.006
Soy -0.006 0.003 -0.832 0.405
Wheat -0.003 0.002
Sugar -0.019 0.004 3.883 0.000
Rice -0.047 0.006
Sugar -0.019 0.004 -3.578 0.000
Wheat -0.003 0.002
Rice -0.047 0.006 -6.957 0.000
Wheat -0.003 0.002
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